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Introduction 
Paradoxically, the idea that the Russian Empire was European and the idea that 
there was a specifically “Russian” characteristic expressed by it both emerged in the 
eighteenth century. The sweeping reforms of Peter I in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries saw the adoption of western European technology, institutions, and 
cultural practices. These shifts entailed the rejection of Muscovite customs through 
measures such as forcing the men of the nobility to shave their beards and ending the 
seclusion of elite women. These reforms allowed the Russian state to enter into European 
geopolitical contests; at the same time, they compelled the elites of the Russian Empire to 
distinguish themselves from France, the German states, the Swedish Empire, and 
England. The Petrine adoption of western European political and cultural forms also 
introduced the ideas and intellectual outlook of the Enlightenment to the educated elite of 
the Russian Empire. Regarding the educated and governing elites’ view of the state, 
eighteenth-century Russian discourses of the monarch’s legitimacy often drew on a 
notion of the “general will” that reflected Enlightenment ideals. In turn, Russian rulers 
began to appeal to “the people” (narod), and to “the public” (publika) in order to justify 
the absolute power invested in the autocrat. 
The importance of the notion of “the public” in the history of France, England and 
Germany has been explored at length by Jürgen Habermas in his Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962). According to Habermas, “the public” 
became the central backdrop for political discussion with the advent of “horizontal 
economic dependencies,” which arose as a result of the increasing dynamism and 
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pervasiveness of the market economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.1 These 
horizontal economic dependencies, in contrast to the vertical economic structure of the 
feudal estates, opened up a space for rational-critical debate between subjects who 
understood themselves, in some sense, as equals. Ultimately, this space would become 
the basis of the modern liberal constitutional state and parliamentary politics, as it 
allowed for the “general interest” of the population to be articulated through reasoned 
debate. 
The extent to which such a public sphere might have existed in the Russian 
Empire has plagued historians as a result of the predominance of vertical economic 
relationships of dependence such as, for example, the institution of serfdom, which was 
maintained until 1861. In addition, the absolute power of the autocrat was upheld until 
the early twentieth century. How could there be a public when the educated elite was 
dependent on the tsar for the maintenance of its position? How is it possible to speak of a 
“public sphere” in an empire where there was no economic base for the elite—as there 
was for the bourgeoisie in western Europe—to speak for the “general interest” of the 
population? 
Yet Catherine II flaunted her Enlightenment credentials. She corresponded with 
Voltaire and Diderot, and sought to apply the principles of the Enlightenment, expounded 
by thinkers like Montesquieu, in her governance; her policies were aimed at the creation 
of a “Third Estate” in Russia. Rather than asking about her “sincerity” in adopting 
Enlightenment-oriented programs, this study investigates the ways in which the 
discourses of legitimacy that served Catherine’s reign made use of Enlightenment ideals. 
                                               
1 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 15. 
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This essay will trace the discourses of legitimacy that arose in the eighteenth century to 
justify the autocratic rule of monarchs after Peter I. Discourses referring to hereditary 
right to the throne, or dynastic discourses, were often employed by Elizabeth I, Peter III, 
and Paul I. In contrast to the dynastic discourse of legitimacy, discourses of progressive 
reform were deployed by monarchs from the time of Peter I onward. This reformist 
discourse—referring to the notion that the Tsar embodied the will of “the people” and 
acted to ensure historical progress—based legitimacy on the sovereign’s capacity to 
better the general weal, not on bloodline. Originally employed by Peter I, this second 
discourse was also central to the reigns of Elizabeth I and Catherine II. Catherine, born a 
foreign princess, had no recourse to discourses of hereditary right, having come to power 
through a palace coup that resulted in the death of Peter III, her husband and a direct 
descendent of Peter I. In her reign, discourses of reform, which drew heavily on 
Enlightenment ideals, provided the basis of her legitimacy. She represented herself as 
worthy of the absolute power invested in her because of her competence, her ability to 
reform, and the strength of her progressive vision. She, more than any other monarch of 
the eighteenth century, sought to personify “the will of the people.” 
Many of her reforms and actions reflected both Enlightenment principles and 
efforts at state-building; the effect of these reforms was to foster the institutions of public 
life. Catherine allowed private publishing; she attempted to engage in public dialogue 
with her contemporaries through publishing her own works anonymously; she 
endeavored to grant more rights to the nobility as an estate, and she did so also to bind its 
members more closely to the capital. Under her rule, the Russian Empire vastly 
expanded, and she justified military conquest by referring to the civilizing mission of 
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progress; the Russian Empire was to bring Enlightenment outward to its periphery. For a 
state as large as the Russian Empire, as Catherine saw it, absolute monarchy alone could 
provide a leader whose passions were sufficiently tempered by reason and education, and 
who was capable of carrying out extensive reforms.  
Arguably, Catherine’s promotion of conceptions of a dynamic autocrat-reformer, 
following on the Petrine discourses of reform, encouraged a growing view of Russian 
“backwardness” as a positive difference—a blank slate to be inscribed by the monarch 
for the common good. The writer Nikolai Karamzin, for example, saw the power invested 
in the autocrat as a bulwark against the social degeneration and public disorder he 
associated with western Europe’s market economy and the French Revolution. This 
discourse of monarchical legitimacy based on reform was paradoxical and two-sided: it 
pointed to accelerated efforts to transform the Russian Empire through an appeal to the 
ideals of the Enlightenment, thus casting Russia as more European than Europe, the 
source of those ideals. But Russia was also seen as different from Europe by educated 
Russians, who hoped that the former’s unique character could help it to avoid the social 
upheaval that they observed in western Europe. This paradox of seeing Russia as both 
European and uniquely Russian is captured in Catherine's “Instructions to the Legislative 
Commission” (1767), an assembled body of representatives from nearly all estates, in 
which she both insisted that “Russia is a European State,” and defended a political system 
that, in her view, was uniquely suited to Russia: autocracy. 
Regarding her self-representation as autocrat, Catherine relied, in part, on 
classical models of gender. She identified with masculine characteristics when it served 
her purpose, and with feminine ones when it was advantageous to do so, such as when 
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she aimed to soften the expansionist violence of her reign by showing herself to be 
gentle, caring, and motherly. As a partly unintended result of her efforts to foster public 
life through promoting print culture and literary discussions, the ideals represented by the 
conjugal family gained increasing importance for the elite, who increasingly 
characterized women as the gentle counterpart—and the opposite—of men.  As I shall 
show, a highly gendered discourse of the family—similar to that identified with the 
European bourgeoisie—became central to the representation of the Russian monarchy 
and the idealization of social relations in the Russian Empire over the course of the 
eighteenth century, despite a lack of horizontal economic dependencies. The emergence 
of conceptions of gender and family shaped by the European bourgeois understanding of 
the “public sphere” among the educated nobility and literary elite suggests that such a 
sphere—in which the educated elites tested new ideas and forged consensus views among 
themselves—also existed around Catherine’s time. This public sphere, unlike that 
described by Habermas in France, Germany or England, did not arise from the sphere of 
economic activities, nor from the state’s guarantee of property rights. In this Russian 
sphere for the expression of opinion, explicitly political views were curtailed, especially 
those challenging the autocracy.  But opinions and ideas that were not overtly political 
were freely exchanged. Such was the case with the literary works and private writings 
that contributed to the idealization of the patriarchal conjugal family, which came out of 
the European bourgeoisie’s attempt to define a private, intimate sphere set apart from the 
public, impersonal sphere. Although not explicitly political, elite ideas and opinions 
about gender and family nevertheless carried political significance. Built on conceptions 
that insisted on a clear division of male and female traits, these ideas and opinions served 
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to delegitimize Catherine’s rule after her death by making a woman’s assumption of male 
traits more questionable. From that point forward, deviations from the ideal of the 
patriarchal conjugal family, which Catherine came to represent, became less acceptable. 
This essay draws on a variety of sources in order to trace the emergence of the 
patriarchal conjugal family in the public sphere of the Russian Empire. I make use of 
poetry, belles lettres, and memoirs. The last of these are particularly useful: like literary 
works they were aimed at a public audience, but they also reflected the views of those 
beyond the small circle of the literary elite. My use of these memoirs is less concerned 
with whether or not the events depicted within them “really” happened. Instead, I 
consider the ways these in which these works deployed different models of gender and 
gender roles in order to trace the relationship between gender construction and the 
emergence of the subjectivity of the private individual that was, as Habermas suggests, 
integral to the workings of publicity. 
Publicity, here, and in the title of this essay, refers to the German Öffentlichkeit, 
the “public sphere” of Habermas’s title. This word can be translated into English as “the 
public sphere,” or as “publicity,” denoting the quality, or characteristics, of a space of 
“unrestricted public discussion.”2 The corresponding term in Russian is 
obshchestvennost’ (publicness), related to obshchestvo (society). But in the eighteenth 
century, most references to “the public” in Russian took the form of the loan word 
publika, from the French word le public. For the subtitle of this essay, I choose the term 
“publicity” in order to emphasize the gendered characteristic of the public sphere, in 
Russia as in western Europe. By tracing the connections between the emergence of the 
                                               
2 Thomas McCarthy, introduction to Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, xii. 
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public sphere and certain models of gender in the Russian Empire, I hope to demonstrate 























Theories of the Public Sphere and the Patriarchal Conjugal Family 
For Habermas, the modern public sphere was born in the absolutist courts of 
France and England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As the result of an 
evolving relationship between private and public spheres, the “bourgeois public sphere 
may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people coming together as a public.”3 
The precursor of this public sphere can be traced back to the early market capitalism of 
the thirteenth century.4 The subsequent growth of towns and the “rise of long-distance 
trade” restructured the social relations of western European society by separating the 
commercial sphere from the direct prerogative of the state. By the sixteenth century, 
“commercial exchange developed according to rules which certainly were manipulated 
by political power,” but apart from the state’s direct control of the economy, “a far-
reaching network of horizontal economic dependencies emerged that … could no longer 
be accommodated by the vertical relationships of dependence characterizing the 
organization of domination in an estate system.”5 As the economic interests of 
merchants—that is, the emerging bourgeoisie—became identified with those of society, 
their desire for economic security came to be understood as the “general interest.”6 In 
order to provide this guarantee of security, and ensure the expansion of foreign trade 
under mercantilist principles, the states of western Europe greatly increased the size and 
influence of their bureaucracies.7 Habermas calls this new centralizing state founded on 
bureaucracy “the sphere of public authority.”  With the emergence of this “public 
                                               
3 Habermas, 26. 
4 Ibid., 14. 
5 Ibid., 15. 
6 Ibid., 19. 
7 Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the 
Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 43. 
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authority,” those subjects of the state whose economic interests were identified as the 
“general interest” were now seen as “private people… because they held no office, [and] 
were excluded from any share in public authority.” In the communications of the state, 
directed at what it saw as the representatives of society’s interests, these private people, 
“as the addressees of public authority, formed the public.”8 
But, according to Habermas, the emerging bourgeoisie saw itself as being at odds 
with the state, and found its continued subjugation to the sphere of public authority 
increasingly arbitrary. By the eighteenth century, a “clearly demarcated sphere of ‘good 
society’”—consisting of a sociability shaped by the court nobility and bourgeois 
notables—formed “an enclave within a society separating itself from the state.”9 At the 
same time, “[c]ivil society came into existence as a corollary of a depersonalized [that is, 
bureaucratized] state authority,” representing the “private” sphere of commodity 
exchange.10 Derived from “good society” and civil society, the “bourgeois public sphere” 
emerged as separate and opposed to the “public authority” of the state. Through their 
opposition to the public authority, the bourgeois strata came “into an awareness of 
itself… as the public of the now emerging public sphere of civil society.”11 This 
perceived adversarial relationship between the “public” and “public authority” defined 
what came to be called the “bourgeois public sphere”—or, simply, the “public sphere”—
as “a forum in which the private people, come together to form a public, readied 
themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion.”12 
                                               
8 Habermas, 18. 
9 Ibid., 11. 
10 Ibid., 30. 
11 Ibid., 23. Emphasis in original. 
12 Ibid., 25-26. 
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In the bourgeois public sphere, public opinion was formed through the “use of 
reason” manifested through “rational-critical public debate,”13 and was the product of 
private people whose relationship to each other was characterized by a sense of equality 
based on the “parity of the educated.”14 Despite this notion of parity, the bourgeois strata 
that made up the “public” in reality consisted of people from diverse social backgrounds, 
including “doctors, pastors … professors … scribes,” those described as “the people,” as 
well as officials of the state and officers of the army.15 The instrument for the 
communication of public opinion was “the commercialization of cultural production,”16 
in particular that of literature. The medium for public debate was the press. In turn, 
literary production and the press both marked the presence of a reading public and 
spurred its growth. In this context, fiction began to emerge as a bourgeois literary form. 
According to Habermas, the new genre of  the“psychological novel” allowed the reader 
“to enter into the literary action as a substitute for his own, to use the relationships 
between the figures, between the author, the character and the reader as substitute 
relationships for reality.”17 That the psychology of discrete and private individuals could 
be considered equivalent and even exchangeable demonstrates the extent to which the 
bourgeois view of the market—into which all participants supposedly entered as equals to 
engage in competition—endowed literature with a similar presumption of equivalency 
among readers. 
                                               
13 Ibid., 27-28. 
14 Ibid., 32. 
15 Ibid., 23. 
16 Ibid., 38. 
17 Ibid., 50. 
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Habermas finds in the “patriarchal conjugal family”18 a key division between 
public and private life that structured the bourgeois public sphere, for only the patriarchs 
of bourgeois families took part—as equal participants—in the rational-critical exchange 
of the public sphere. This public sphere, based on subjective equivalency between the 
heads of families, “flowed from the wellspring of a specific subjectivity [that came out 
of] the sphere of the patriarchal conjugal family.”19 
The head of the bourgeois family in western Europe combined the role of 
“property owner with that of ‘human being,’”20 for the intimacy of the family served to 
cultivate his personality, which would in turn serve as the moral basis for his rational-
critical exchange in the public. The notion of the intimacy of the family undergirded that 
of the “private autonomy” of its members, although it did so by “denying [the family’s] 
economic origins.” The family seemed to the bourgeois self-understanding “to be 
established voluntarily and by free individuals and to be maintained without coercion.” 
The “lasting community of love” between husband and wife underpinned the private 
realm of intimacy as well as the independence of the head of the family—the husband—
who entered into the public. But this “independence of the property owner… was 
complemented by the dependence of the wife and children on the male head of the 
family.”21 At the same time, the private, domestic sphere became clearly separated from 
the public one. Marriage, now a contractual arrangement between a man and a woman, 
came to be seen as founded on mutual and consensual love, and provided the rationale for 
the gendered division of the domestic sphere from the public sphere. According to 
                                               
18 Ibid., 44. 
19 Ibid., 43. 
20 Ibid., 28-29. 
21 Ibid., 47. 
12 
Habermas, “the conjugal family’s self-image of its intimate sphere collided with the real 
functions of the bourgeois family,” which were based on “the reproduction of capital.” 
Authority in the family was a decisively male characteristic, as was the public exercise of 
rational-critical faculties.22 
Since the publication of Habermas’s work, scholars have both criticized and 
refined his formulation of the patriarchal conjugal family. For Habermas, the emerging 
bourgeoisie claimed authority for itself by presenting the head of the family as the ideal 
of an autonomous individual, and the “structural transformation” that occurred was a 
divestment of power from the vertically organized sphere of aristocratic society to the 
horizontally organized patriarchal conjugal families of the bourgeoisie. The gendered 
division of the public and private spheres was part of the process of this transformation. 
To scholars such as Joan Landes, however, Habermas’s work offers an inadequate 
account of “the relation of the public sphere to women and to feminism.”23 In Landes’s 
view, the gendered division that corresponded to the formation of new institutions of 
power and publicity in the eighteenth century were not a symptom of the structural shift 
of publicity, but rather integral to its social-historical trajectory. In particular, she has in 
mind the absolutist courts of France, epitomized by that of Louis XIV, and the way that 
the absolute power of the French monarch functioned “to ‘domesticate,’ even un-man, 
those who ought to have been his peers.” This was how the absolutist court was seen by 
                                               
22 Ibid., 46-47. 
23 Joan Landes, Women in the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 7. By Feminism, Landes refers not to a specific moral-ideological position, but 
rather to the historical phenomenon of feminist political advocacy which, in her view, was made possible 
by the social shifts that occurred over the course of the French Revolution and throughout the 1790s. 
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the revolutionaries, “who celebrated the virile constitutions of republics and despised the 
‘effeminized’ status of men under absolutism.”24 
 Seen in this light, the sphere of public authority that preceded the bourgeois 
public sphere was always already gendered. The aristocratic salon, as a venue for 
rational-critical debate prior to the rise of the bourgeois public, “was set apart from [other 
spheres of cultural production]... by its pronounced feminine character.”25 Another 
scholar, Dena Goodman, emphasizes the role of women in the salons in her claims that 
the challenge to the absolutist court expressed through them “was not to nobility itself or 
even to the monarchy’s cooptation of it,” but rather against the notion of “birth as the 
basis of nobility.” Promoting intellectual and literary endeavors, the aristocratic salons 
“asserted the idea that nobility could be acquired, and that the salonnières were 
instrumental in helping the initiate to do so.”26 In Landes’s view, women’s dominance of 
the salon brought on a potent reaction, for “the secret power of bourgeois… universalist 
rhetoric may be seen to derive from the way it promised to empty out the feminine 
connotations (and ultimately, the women as well) of absolutist public life.”27 The 
eighteenth-century appeals to honesty, to transparency and to bourgeois civility were thus 
seen as masculine in character, in contrast to the feminine traits associated with 
dissimulation, which bourgeois men believed to permeate the salon. In this way, the 
overthrow of French absolutism also ushered in a new “symbolic order of nature… in 
which all differences were fixed, and where the sexes were positioned in their proper 
                                               
24 Ibid., 21. 
25 Ibid., 40. 
26 Dena Goodman, “Enlightenment Salons: The Convergence of Female and Philosophic Ambitions,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 22, no. 3 (1989): 331. 
27 Landes, 40. 
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places within the contrasting but mutually interdependent spheres of public and domestic 
life.”28 
 Thomas Laqueur’s work on the cultural history of sexual difference is also 
instructive for understanding the problems of gender raised by Habermas’s theory of the 
formation of the public sphere. Laqueur sees a sharp break in the social construction of 
the body in precisely the period when the bourgeois public sphere arose. It was then that 
“sex as we know it was invented.”29 Accord to Laqueur, before the Enlightenment, and 
dating back to ancient Greece, there was no precise distinction between sex and gender, 
but rather “[w]hat we call sex and gender [were] in the Renaissance bound up in a circle 
of meanings from which escape to a supposed biological substratum is impossible.”30This 
pre-modern understanding of sexual difference in bodies, which Laqueur calls the “one 
sex model,” referred to “vital heat” as the main differentiating force between male and 
female bodies. Vital heat, not measurable but visible in the manifestations of sexed 
bodies, would either cause genitals to extrovert over the course of their development, 
thereby forming a male body, or, in lesser quantity, leave the genitals inside the body, 
thereby rendering it female. In this understanding of sexual difference, first articulated by 
the Greek philosopher Galen (c. 129-217 CE), “the vagina is imagined as an interior 
penis, the labia as foreskin, the uterus as scrotum, and the ovaries as testicles.” As 
Laqueur writes, this view of anatomy positioned women as “inverted, and hence less 
perfect, men.”31 
                                               
28 Ibid., 46. 
29 Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 149. 
30 Ibid., 128. 
31 Ibid., 26-28. 
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In the eighteenth century the one sex model was largely replaced—though never 
entirely eliminated—by a “two sex model” based on the idea that male and female bodies 
were biologically distinct, rather than unequally developed forms of the same body. Even 
with the vast anatomical discoveries accomplished during the Renaissance, under the one 
sex model “the assertion that in generation the male was the efficient and the female the 
material cause was, in principle, not physically demonstrable; it was itself a restatement 
of what it meant to be male or female.” By contrast, the two sex model “provided a 
naturalistic explanation and justification for the social status of women” by turning “[t]he 
womb, which had been a sort of negative phallus [into] the uterus.” Thus, eighteenth-
century scientific discourse “fleshed out, in terms acceptable to the new epistemology, 
the categories ‘male’ and ‘female’ as opposite and incommensurable biological sexes.”32 
But Laqueur does not mean to say that the discourse of one sex was usurped 
entirely by the discourse of two sexes in such a remarkably short period of time. As he 
writes, “[o]ne sex... did not die. But it met a powerful alternative: a biology of 
incommensurability in which the relationship between men and women was not 
inherently one of equality or inequality but rather of difference that required 
interpretation.” Henceforth, the two sex model would compete with the one sex model as 
an explanation for the physical, social and political difference that was visible between 
men and women. “Sex, in other words, replaced what we might call gender as a primary 
foundational category. Indeed, the framework in which the natural and the social could be 
clearly distinguished came into being.”33 
                                               
32 Ibid., 152-154 
33 Ibid., 154. 
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Since the social and political superiority of men over women could no longer be 
understood as an unequal manifestation of “vital heat” in bodies, Enlightenment writers 
drew on the two sex model’s reference to biologically determined difference as an 
explanation for the inferior social status of women. Linking biology to nature, they 
invoked the latter “to justify [men’s] dominance of the public sphere, whose distinction 
from the private would increasingly come to be figured in terms of sexual difference.” 
Since the process of the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere in the eighteenth 
century is almost precisely contemporaneous with the epistemological dominance of the 
two sex model: 
The promises of the French Revolution—that mankind in 
all its social and cultural relations could be regenerated, 
that women could achieve not only civil but personal 
liberties, that family, morality, and personal relations could 
all be made afresh—gave birth not only to a genuine new 
feminism but also to a new kind of antifeminism, a new 
fear of women, and to political boundaries that engendered 
sexual boundaries to match.34 
 
Unlike Habermas, Laqueur and Landes view the emergence of the discourse of 
incommensurable difference between the sexes as inextricable from the history of the 
formation of the public sphere.
                                               
34 Ibid., 194. 
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The Public Sphere in the Russian Context 
 Habermas’s claim that the notion of subjective equivalency had permeated and 
restructured the culture and politics of western Europe presents a serious problem for the 
student of Russian history. First, the “horizontal economic dependencies” which 
Habermas views as the basis for the formation of a public sphere in Western Europe were 
clearly lacking in the vertically ordered and highly stratified Russian society, as the 
empire’s subjects were “assigned to a particular legal category or status” that was defined 
by privileges and “activities proper to that estate.”35 The status of the small population of 
registered townspeople—the social group that perhaps most resembled a nascent 
bourgeoisie by their occupation—was hereditary,36 making it unlikely for them to grow 
into a numerically significant stratum. Politically, the autocratic government might be 
seen as more likely to prohibit than foster public debate, since “all that was not 
specifically authorized was forbidden, and only that could be done which was specifically 
authorized.”37 Literary production and other cultural endeavors of the eighteenth century 
were often directed by the state.  At the same time, the educated elite seemed to have 
been more concerned with adopting the “standards set by the foreigner and his culture,” 
than to express their independence.38 Given these differences from the conditions of 
western Europe, it is not surprising that Habermas denies the possibility of a public 
sphere in Russia, as he sees the adversarial relationship between the sphere of public 
                                               
35 Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1981), 79. 
36 Ibid., 90-91. 
37 Ibid.,  79. 
38 Hans Rogger, National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1960), 51-52. 
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opinion and the sphere of public authority as a necessary criterion for the emergence of a 
bourgeois public.39 
Recent scholarship, however, has taken a different approach. Cynthia Whittaker, 
for example, argues that the praise and justification literature celebrating the eighteenth-
century sovereigns played an analogous function to the expression of public opinion in 
western Europe, as this literature opened up a “dialogue between ruler and ruled.”40 This 
literature of praise, as it implored the monarch to adopt reforms, often put forward the 
writer’s own agenda. This literature thus constituted a public debate in which some of the 
empire’s subjects exercised their rational-critical faculties under the guidance and 
supervision of the tsar, whose legitimacy was, in turn, confirmed by the writers.  In this 
way, these writers also helped to define the autocrat as the personification of popular will, 
and to define her/his mission as reform. According to Whittaker, eighteenth-century 
writers “viewed public praise as a formal method for approving policies, and the practice 
of commending monarchs as a moral obligation to steer the course of government.”41 
Similarly, “eighteenth-century belletrists obsessively portrayed ideal rulers in order to 
suggest universal criteria by which rulers should be judged.”42 Since the readers of this 
praise and advice literature were not only monarchs but also a wide circle of educated 
elites, the dialogue that was conducted through this literature was not only one between 
monarch and subjects; it was also a public dialogue among the educated. 
The legacy of Peter I was a reoccurring theme for writers of the eighteenth 
century. As Vera Proskurina points out, the “concept of the brilliant accomplishment of 
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the deeds which Peter I had begun became one of the most popular poetic formulas in 
Catherine’s time.”43 By the same criterion, however, the failure to pursue particular 
policies of reform could result in the monarch’s being re-cast as a despot, the “bad tsar,” 
or “an immoral sovereign” who “threatened to corrupt the state and cause the decline of 
Russia.”44 This judgment was directed against Peter III to justify his overthrow in 1762.45 
Other recent historians criticize Habermas’s dismissal of the possibility of a 
public sphere in the Russian Empire. Douglas Smith, in his study of Freemasonry in 
Russian during the eighteenth century, concluded that “Russia, like other European 
countries at the time, was forming a civil society or ‘public sphere’ beyond the realms of 
state, church, and family.”46 For Smith, the historical processes that Russian society 
underwent were similar to those in Western Europe. These included “the growth of the 
absolutist state, and the development of economic and commercial activity” around the 
turn of the eighteenth century, as well as the rapid dissemination of Enlightenment ideas 
and Western European practices, which, in regards to Russia, is often referred to as 
“Westernization.”47 Alexander Martin, suggesting the presence of a public sphere located 
between the “government” and “society,”points to the efforts of Catherine II to “stimulate 
participation in government by society.”48 Turning to literature, Andrew Kahn notes that 
the Russian literary elite both constituted a public, and worked—for the consumption of 
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this public, that is, itself—to construct discourses framed by what they thought were the 
desirable features of a political structure suited to the Russian Empire.49 
These recent findings on the presence of a public sphere in eighteenth-century 
Russia remain controversial, however. Andreas Schönle takes on this question by 
investigating the formation of the private sphere in his article “The Scare of the Self.” 
Suggesting the absence of a public sphere that allowed for open and independent debate, 
Schönle asserts that the cultivation of the private autonomous individual self was 
compromised by various cultural and political aspects of eighteenth-century and early-
nineteenth-century Russia. He claims that for the literary elite and the educated members 
of the nobility, “[t]he necessity to follow etiquette, to speak the right language and the 
right idiom, to wear the right fashion, and to affect the right taste... tended... to obliterate 
whatever sense of private self could unify the personality.”50 The sense of privacy was, 
moreover, not permitted to develop, both because of autocratic state—which failed to 
establish property and individual rights—and the elite’s desire to strengthen the nobility’s 
corporate identity at the expense of privateness and individual autonomy.51 In a statement 
reminiscent of a common view that Russia’s Europeanization was superficial, Schönle 
states that “the philosophy of the individualist modern self that underlies privacy rights 
remained only skin-deep” in the Russian Empire.52 
My thesis takes up the question of publicity in the Russian Empire by examining 
the construction of gender in several eighteen-century texts, ranging from advice and 
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celebratory literature to travelogues and personal memoirs that explored private feelings. 
By focusing in particular on how these works depicted gender roles in relation to the 
family and domesticity, I intend to show that Russian educated elites were actively 
engaged in articulating their social ideals. How they did so suggests the presence of a 
public that bore the characteristics described by Habermas, even if this Russian public—
the eighteenth-century educated elites—did not express its views in an explicitly political 


















Background: The Petrine Reforms and Their Effects on Monarchical Legitimacy 
Peter I’s reforms were numerous and far-reaching. He radically restructured the 
navy and army, the noble estates, and the bureaucracy in order to accommodate the 
military needs of his time. Reflecting the radicality of his reforms, the iconography of the 
sovereign was also reimagined in his reign. Rather than embodying the “divine right” to 
rule, the figure of the tsar was redefined under Peter as a monarch whose authority was 
derived from his “divine duty” to serve the state. According to Whittaker, the 
representation of the autocrat under Peter “demystified the monarchy by making it less a 
divine calling than a normal job.” Whereas the concept of divine right draws on a 
theologically justified discourse of legitimacy, the notion of divine duty legitimizes the 
monarch by referring to secular criteria such as competence, ability, and deeds, which 
“squarely contradicted [the] divine right theory” of legitimacy. By Peter’s reign, the 
absolute power invested in the figure of the tsar was justified by his ability to bring about 
progressive reforms.53 
Peter’s emphasis on tying the monarch’s authority to his ability to implement 
reforms was intertwined with the portrayal of the monarch as a servant of the state. As 
Whittaker notes, “by cast[ing] himself as subordinate to the state,” Peter opened up a 
space in which the similarity of the sovereign to his subjects was asserted.54 At the same 
time, the equality of his subjects among themselves was affirmed by the institution of the 
Table of Ranks. This system of promotion replaced birth and social status with merit as 
the primary criterion for recruitment for state service and advancement in rank. The Table 
of Ranks, in theory, permitted anyone who was capable, regardless of social origin, to 
                                               
53 Whittaker, Russian Monarchy, 39. 
54 Ibid., 82. 
23 
rise to the top of the bureaucracy and the military. Further diminishing the significance of 
birth, the Table of Ranks allowed members of non-noble estates who rose above certain 
positions to acquire the status of hereditary nobility. 
But even as the servant of the state, the sovereign was always elevated above his 
subjects, who served the autocrat. The tsar was “the engineer of the universe” who “put 
… in motion” the “new machine” of the progressive state, and “gave it direction and 
purpose.”55 But this new discourse of legitimacy endorsed by Peter was not entirely 
accepted by the elite. The power of the dynastic discourse of legitimacy—indeed, it was 
this discourse that gave support to Peter’s bid for the throne—had not ceased to be 
resonant. In 1722 Peter attempted to eradicate the notion of legitimacy based on 
hereditary succession with his decree entitled “The Right of the Monarch’s Will to 
Designate an Heir to His Throne,” which abolished primogeniture as the basis for 
accession, and allowed the monarch to choose his successor based on merit and 
dedication to reform. But here, Peter “committed an error of judgment by thinking reform 
could replace the most universal legitimization of rule,” and in the power struggle that 
ensued after his death, dynastic discourse ultimately triumphed.56  
Peter failed to appoint a successor before his death, and his wife acceded to the 
throne as Catherine I in 1725, hailed by supporters as the continuation of Peter’s legacy. 
After her death in 1727, Peter I’s grandson, Peter II, took the throne. A sickly man, he 
died in 1730, making way for Anna I, the daughter of Peter’s half-brother, Ivan V.  The 
Petrine reforms had made the nobility’s privilege dependent on state service, and state 
service, in turn, was the primary precondition to gaining social status under Peter’s rule. 
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However, “[a]fter the death of Peter I in 1725, the gentry concentrated their efforts on the 
attainment” of “security and leisure.”57 When Anna took power in 1730, the nobility saw 
their chance to recover the privileges of their estates that had been removed by the 
Petrine reforms. Anna re-enshrined dynastic legitimacy as the basis of her rule. 
But the Petrine reforms also had important implications regarding gender. Peter 
mandated that noble women, previously confined to specific quarters at home, be brought 
out of seclusion. This was part of his general program to weaken the nobility, for by 
bringing women into public spaces he “undermined the authority over sexual 
relationships” claimed by the heads of noble families. He also weakened the likelihood 
for members of the nobility to form alliances through marriage ties by requiring a brief 
period of betrothal before marriage, “during which time the affianced had the option to 
break off the engagement.”58 By bringing women into public spaces, Peter “presented 
them as embodiments of Westernized nobility, both at official functions and at the less 
formal assemblei.” This reform coincided with the emergence of a new femininity in late 
seventeenth-century France, in which “the devotion to the world of the sublime and 
genteel... took the form of worship of idealized feminine forms.” According to Richard 
Wortman, women in Russia, as in France, from this point on “represented love as 
supreme beauty, tamer of discord, the inspiration for a poetry of terrestrial bliss. Woman 
represented man’s higher faculties rather than the snares of the passions. Marriage 
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became the consummation of love rather than the acceptance of divinely ordained 
paternal authority.”59 
 Neither dynastic legitimacy nor the discourse of progressive reform necessarily 
excluded women from positions of power. Women could be the direct descendents of the 
divinely ordained monarch, but they could also prove themselves to be competent in their 
deeds. Nevertheless, a woman in power needed to go to great lengths to justify her rule in 
the terms of either discourse. The discourse of one sex allowed for greater flexibility in 
the representation of a female monarch, since she could be like a man according to her 
inner virtue. On the other hand, the emerging two sex model figured women as gentle, 
caring, and maternal. This discourse could be used to soften the real violence that goes 
along with sweeping reforms and imperial expansion. The women who ruled in the 
eighteenth century drew on both the one sex model and the two sex model, on both 
dynastic and reforming discourses of legitimacy, to justify their power. 
 The one sex model remained resonant among eighteenth-century Russian elites. 
The female monarchs after Peter I drew from both sex models to establish their 
legitimacy. Anna (r. 1730-1740), Elizabeth I (r. 1741-1762), and Catherine II (r. 1762-
1796) each justified their reigns through progressive reforms, but at the same time they 
presented themselves as the “mothers” of their subjects, whose caring and maternal 
natures necessitated and softened sometimes brutal measures. As Wortman shows, “[i]t is 
no accident that women rulers proved able to fuse the personae of conquering and 
conserving monarchs, for only they could claim to defend Peter’s heritage without 
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threatening a return to his punitive fury,” a masculine trait.60 The ability of female 
monarchs to pull from competing models of sexual difference no doubt helped to sustain 
their rule. 
 Anna’s rise to power in 1730 was supported by members of the high nobility, who 
believed she would relinquish the absolute right to rule claimed by Peter I and share 
power with them. Upon taking power, however, she turned against her initial supporters 
and allied herself with the faction of the nobility that supported absolute monarchy. 
Subsequently, Anna’s self-representation relied on her pursuit of the “general good,” and 
her claim to resist the “specific interests of the aristocrats.” The idea of a monarch who 
pursued the general interest, an image first championed by Peter I, was thus solidified in 
the figure of Anna, but this time, with a maternal twist.61 After Anna, Elizabeth and 
Catherine followed a similar pattern, using their status as the second sex, and the 
feminized notions of purity, gentility and passionlessness that went with it, to justify their 
autocratic rule. Nevertheless, they often represented themselves as androgynous figures, 
not entirely defined by an image of domestic femininity. 
 When Elizabeth I, Peter I’s daughter, took the throne in 1741 she drew on both 
reformist and dynastic discourses of legitimacy. In so doing, she justified her coup 
against the child-tsar Ivan VI (r. 1740-1741), whose reign was dominated by the regency 
of Ernst Johann Biron, a German from Courland and a close advisor of Anna I. Biron 
came to stand for the detested “rule of foreigners,” and was a symbol of deviation from 
Peter’s program of reform during the reign of Ivan VI.62 Contrasting her reign against 
that of Anna and Biron, Elizabeth’s rule made use of “layers of legitimacy,” projecting 
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the “interlocking images of Peter’s direct offspring and of a Petrine-model reforming 
tsar.”63 The period of Biron’s regency brought with it a reconsideration of the memory of 
Peter I. Biron, a widely despised foreigner, was contrasted against an increasingly 
positive image of Peter, the Russian tsar who pursued the interests of the Russian Empire, 
not its German neighbors. According to Hans Rogger, “[f]rom that time on, a protest 
against foreigners and their role in Russia was no longer automatically synonymous with 
the wish to undo the work of modernization and reform which Peter had begun. Instead, 
it could be made in his name and in defense of his ideals.”64 From the time of Elizabeth’s 
coup, reforms in the image of the European states could be made in the defense of a 
specifically Russian character. Among other ideas, the image of the feminine, maternal, 
and gentle woman—like Elizabeth—could be rallied to the cause of anti-foreign 
domination. 
 Elizabeth’s rule was justified by her position in the dynastic family, as Peter’s 
daughter, but tied into this dynastic legitimacy was also a promise to continue in the spirit 
of his reforms. The Petrine reforms had increased the size and the education of the elite, 
which had more and more been inculcated with the ideals of the western European 
Enlightenment. In this context, the odic tradition became central to the public exercise of 
rational-critical faculties in Imperial Russia. On the one hand, odes extolled the supreme 
figure of the monarch, but on the other hand, “as in other European states, the panegyric 
also served as a tactful form of instructions.”65 The monarch accepted praise from her 
subjects through odes, but she was also expected to listen to the advice put forward, 
reflecting a tacit recognition of the tsar’s legitimacy being contingent on the support of 
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the elite. The writer and educator Mikhail Lomonosov (1711-1765) proves especially 
interesting here because the reforms that he promoted in his odes were profoundly tied 
with the Enlightenment programs of western Europe. 
 Lomonosov embodied the upward mobility made possible by the Petrine reforms. 
Although born a free peasant, he had access to primary education and in 1736 left for 
Germany under the sponsorship of the Academy of Sciences, created by Peter.66 For the 
remainder of his career, he would advocate for the benefits of the Petrine Reforms, 
particularly regarding education, which “urgently needed defending.”67 In his poem, 
“Ode on the Day of Accession to the All-Russian Throne of Her Majesty the Sovereign 
Empress Elizabeth Petrovna in the Year of 1747,” the tension between the exercise of 
rational-critical faculties and the performance of formal submission to the tsar is 
palpable. He reinforced the dynastic legitimacy of Elizabeth’s rule by emphasizing her 
connection to Peter, for example, when he wrote that, “When she [Elizabeth] acceded to 
the throne, / As the almighty gave her the crown / You [the land] became Russia once 
again.” In the same stanza, he described Elizabeth kissing Russia while saying, “I have 
had enough of these victories... for which streams of blood are spilt. / I rejoice in the 
happiness of Russians (rossov), / I would not trade their tranquility / For all the West and 
all the East.”68 Although Elizabeth’s legitimacy was represented here as dynastic, and 
seemingly unassailable, Lomonosov nevertheless introduced a note of caution, implying 
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that a monarch bent on warmongering would suffer the loss of trust of “Russians” whose 
happiness and tranquility she would compromise. His support was not unconditional. 
 Lomonosov repeatedly referred to the sciences (nauki) in the poem, promoting the 
expansion of education which, in his view, had been neglected since the death of Peter I. 
“Be silent, fiery sounds / And stop disturbing the world (svet): / Here on earth (v mire) 
the sciences will spread / As Elizabeth decreed.”69 Alluding to the time before Peter I, 
Lomonosov wrote, “Back then the divine sciences / Through mountains, rivers and seas, / 
Extended their hands to Russia, / Saying to this monarch: / ‘We, with extreme eagerness, 
are prepared / To give to the Russian race the new / Fruits of the finest minds.’ / The 
monarch summoned them / Indeed Russia was awaiting / The benefit of their labors.”70 
Not only did Lomonosov draw a direct political connection between Elizabeth and her 
father, but he made clear in his poem that education was one of the prerequisites for that 
connection being drawn. Ultimately, support for the sciences promised glory for Russia: 
“Oh you [the sciences], whom / The fatherland from its depths awaits / And wishes to see 
such as you, / Whom it summons from foreign countries (stran) / O, your days are 
blessed! / Dare now, heartened, / Show through your endeavor (rachen’em), / That the 
Russian land (rossiiskaia zemlia) could give birth / To our own Platos / And quick-witted 
Newtons.”71 
 Although, as mentioned, the dynastic discourse of legitimacy was invoked in 
Lomonosov’s ode, the reformist discourse of legitimacy was privileged. He tactfully 
referred to a kind of subjective equivalency between himself and the monarch by 
referring to the Petrine doctrine of merit as the justification of power. Referring further to 
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the importance of the sciences, he wrote that they “nourish the young, / Give comfort to 
the old,” and they “are beneficial everywhere / Among crowds (narodov) and in deserted 
[places], / Amid city noise and in solitude, / In sweet leisure and at work.” The next and 
final stanza returned to Elizabeth: “For You [Tebe], o Source of mercy, / O angel of our 
peaceful age! / ... / The Creator will preserve You, / Unhindered (bespretknovennu) in all 
paths [You take] / And He will render your life blessed, / As the scope (chislo) of Your 
munificence.”72  
With these two final lines, which suggested that the blessings of Elizabeth’s reign 
would be matched by her generosity in supporting the sciences, Lomonosov hinted that 
the ultimate judgment had yet to be cast by God, despite the effusive praise that he laid at 
her feet. Lomonosov’s ode carried the message that without sufficient attention to a 
proper program of reform, the legitimacy of Elizabeth’s reign would be threatened. 
Describing the paths that Elizabeth would take as “unhindered,” Lomonosov tacitly 
showed his support for the monarch’s absolute rule, for, as the embodiment of the will of 
the people, she had the power to pursue any particular program. But she was also warned 
against ignoring his advice. In the end, Elizabeth’s deeds would be the basis of her 
judgment. As Whittaker points out, “[s]ometimes monarchs follow advice.” 
Lomonosov’s calls for promoting in education were heeded, and Elizabeth decreed the 
founding of Moscow University in 1755 and the Academy of Fine Arts in 1756. 
Elizabeth claimed that she was “rushing to propagate all useful knowledge… for the 
common good, in imitation of Peter, the obnovitel’ [reformer] of our country.”73 
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Lomonosov’s ode included effusive praise, but that does not exclude the 
possibility of the presence of political dialogue. The use of praise itself can vary, and in 
this case, a discussion of the advisability of military campaigns and education is certainly 
present. The fact that they are contained in a panegyric does not necessitate that they 
were hollow proclamations. On the contrary, what is present in this ode is a very 





Monarchical Legitimacy under Catherine II 
Indeed, Peter was increasingly seen as the founder of a new country, one who 
renewed Russia, and the Moscovite habits and practices he sought to eliminate became 
more alien to the elites of the Russian Empire. When Catherine II acceded to the throne 
in 1762, the discourse of the reforming tsar was once again deployed. A German princess 
with no hereditary claim to the throne, she could draw only on the reformist discourse of 
legitimacy. Peter III, her husband, was deposed in a coup led by Catherine, and 
denounced as a despot in an era when despotism and monarchy were far from 
synonymous. Peter, the nephew of Elizabeth I, was well positioned to claim dynastic 
legitimacy, being both related to Peter I and having been legally appointed as the heir by 
Elizabeth. He failed, however, to establish an alliance with the nobility, and to represent 
himself as the embodiment of consensus and popular will.74 Thus, when Catherine 
deposed him and took power, the coup was acclaimed “as an act of heroic deliverance.”75 
Catherine, if only by necessity, was the ultimate reforming tsar. Her coup was 
presented in her accession manifesto as “the dawn of a new age,” with a renewed focus 
on progress and the implementation of reforms as the only basis of legitimacy. Her self-
representation as a reformer took the form of her well-publicized endorsement of 
Enlightenment thought. Her strength and competence as a reformer, as well as her 
decisiveness and ability to articulate the proper reforms for the Russian Empire, were no 
doubt seen as masculine characteristics. But Catherine, as Elizabeth, “exemplified male 
as well as female qualities, both prowess and graciousness.”76 
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Catherine’s self-representation was androgynous. References to gender in her 
memoir—aligned with the one sex model—appeared in her recurring discussions of 
horseback riding. She frequently depicted herself reading and riding in her leisure time, 
and these two activities were often brought up together.77 She understood horseback 
riding as an inherently masculine activity. According to her memoir, Empress Elizabeth 
“exclaimed in astonishment” upon seeing Catherine ride, remarking “that it was 
impossible to mount more skillfully.” On learning that Catherine was riding on a 
woman’s saddle, the Empress reportedly said, “one would swear that she is on a man’s 
saddle.”78 For Catherine, riding was also a refined activity, not part of the base and cruel 
practice of hunting so enjoyed by men. “To tell the truth, I cared not at all for hunting, 
but I passionately loved horseback riding… Also during this time, I always had a book in 
my pocket; if I had a moment to myself, I used it to read.”79 
Pairing reading with horseback riding in reminiscences of her youth, Catherine 
suggested that reading was, like riding, a masculine activity. Moreover, by insisting on 
her penchant for reading, Catherine presented herself as a rational individual committed 
to self-cultivation. She described being exposed to the works of Voltaire, Baronio, 
Montesquieu, and Tacitus, during a bout of illness. She wrote that “[p]erhaps” her 
“despondent frame of mind at the time” made her receptive to these thinkers. Suggesting 
that having read their work in her youth prepared her for the gravity of her task as 
monarch, she continued: “I began to see more things with a black outlook and to seek the 
causes that really underlay and truly shaped the different interests in the affairs that I 
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observed.”80 As Catherine described it in her memoir, reading led her to look outward—a 
masculine response—to affairs that she “observed.” In her case, her memoir seemed to 
insist, reading did not point to an inward turn toward domesticity, as it would for women 
who read to become good wives. 
Catherine’s reign lasted over thirty years, during which she managed to obtain the 
general cooperation of the educated elite, yet the legitimacy of her rule remained 
precarious. Her foreign origin and lack of blood ties to the preceding monarchs put 
particular pressure on her and her supporters to justify her reign by emphasizing the 
reformist discourse of legitimacy, which allowed them to redefine the line of succession 
as one based on competence, and to present Catherine as the true successor of Peter I, the 
tsar-reformer. In order to justify her coup, Catherine issued two manifestos immediately 
after her accession. As Whittaker put it, Catherine’s manifestos argued that “Peter [III], 
while legally appointed, had betrayed his office by pursuing despotic policies that placed 
the Russian state and tradition in jeopardy.” In light of this betrayal, “the elite had agreed 
to transfer loyalty to Catherine in the expectation that she would better fulfill the 
conditions of the contract between ruler and ruled.”81 
Reformist legitimacy in Catherine’s reign took the form of an appeal to the public. 
Her memoirs expressed her concern, as his spouse and on his behalf, that Peter III would 
“perhaps never recover” from his low standing in “public opinion.”82 This public was 
decisively Russian, and it was Peter’s alienation from a “Russian” culture which also 
served to legitimize her coup, for “[h]e felt that he had not been born for Russia, that he 
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did not suit the Russians nor the Russians him.”83 Thus Catherine, through her reformist 
program, came to represent herself and her program as distinctly Russian, despite her 
German origin. By representing herself as a good tsar, in contrast to the despotism of 
Peter, she became Russian in the eyes of the public. 
In order to avert the fear of despotism, advocates of autocratic rule often 
emphasized the “rule of law, a combination of Rechtsstaat and Ständestaat.”84 The 
former of these terms refers to the limitation of governmental—or monarchical—power 
in accordance with clearly articulated rules. Ständestaat is a related concept, but refers to 
power invested in a particular group that embodies the general good. For Catherine, the 
Stand (status or estate) that could speak for the country as a whole was the nobility. This 
preference was shown by her interest in formally defining the nobility’s right through 
such measures as the Charter to the Nobility (1785). Catherine’s efforts to develop a 
literary public can be seen, in relation to this preference, as attempts to encourage self-
cultivation among members of the nobility. In Catherine’s view, the autocrat, invested 
with absolute power though she might be, “acted within limits.”85 Since the seventeenth 
century autocracy had been justified in that “the monarch alone could rise above group 
interests and rule for the ‘common good.’”86 Catherine likewise saw the place of the 
autocrat as elevated above petty group interests, and her duty as that of advancing 
progress, as she herself would be subordinated to reason. 
Catherine’s self-representation as tsar-reformer helped to define the notion of 
“public opinion” as a consensus of the nobility and as the assent of the popular masses. 
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Descriptions of her coronation, for the first time in Russian history, recorded shouts of 
“hoorah!” from the masses assembled in the audience, meant to demonstrate the love of 
“the people” for the new Empress.87 Those on the periphery of the Empire, not civilized 
enough to appreciate her rule, were expected to learn from her example, and she was 
expected to provide a model of moral and civic cultivation.88 
The discourse of empire was invariably invoked in relationship to the taming of 
nature. As Schönle shows, Catherine and Prince Grigorii Potemkin, a close advisor to the 
Empress, spent a great deal of time and effort designing and constructing gardens in the 
Crimean Peninsula after its annexation. According to Schönle “the garden... became a 
master trope of [the] model of multicultural coexistence” that was required for the 
stewardship of this newly conquered Islamic people.89 Gardens represented the 
“combination of orderliness and freedom,” the same notion inscribed in the figure of the 
autocrat under Catherine. The reforming tsar would insure the orderliness of society by 
pursuing the proper policies with the ultimate goal of promoting the general interest. As 
Schönle points out, the gardens built in Crimea were “rigorously structured,” yet were 
built in such a way that “enable[d] its visitors to roam around freely.”90 By ordering and 
taming the passions of self-interest, the absolute power invested in the autocrat would 
guarantee freedom to those who had been sufficiently morally cultivated; subjugation to 
the monarch, paradoxically, was the price of freedom. The role of the state, of the 
Empire, and of the autocrat was to impose order and civilization on a world that, left 
unchecked, would tend toward disorder and social disintegration. Catherine reconciled 
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absolute authority with Enlightenment calls for dignity through her focus on the law, and 
the “self-limited exercise of power.”91 Just as the state needed to tame the threat of nature 
against civilization, the moral cultivation of the person of the monarch was necessary to 
stave off passion, which, without vigilance, would overcome reason. The size and scope 
of the Russian Empire, massive as it was, was used to argue for the importance of this 
concept. Catherine, in her memoirs, expressed concern over the inability of Peter III to 
manage his landholdings in Germany, since “they were only a small sample of what he 
would one day have to manage when the Russian Empire passed to him.”92 
The garden represented the notion of autocracy as a whole. As the upheaval 
following the death of Peter I demonstrated to the Russian elite, the absolute authority of 
the autocrat was needed not only for preventing social and political disorder but also for 
installing the rule of law. This notion of the efficacy of autocracy for achieving the 
common good was extended into the realms of scientific knowledge and territorial 
expansion. Territorial expansion was seen as the taming of nature—as Schönle shows—
and, according to Willard Sutherland, science became a key instrument of territorial 
expansion, providing the means for “knowing the ‘land’ and the ‘people’ and managing 
their interrelationship effectively.” Under Catherine, “[g]eography, ethnography, history, 
and archeology... [became] part of a common project of knowledge, and the acquisition 
and use of this knowledge [became] a prerequisite for ‘persons charged with the state’s 
administration.’”93 
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An analysis of the discourses of legitimacy deployed by Catherine demonstrates 
the extent to which her reign necessarily involved itself with a larger body of the 
population than the Empress and her immediate supporters. Because she lacked any 
hereditary ties to previous tsars, Catherine had to present herself according to the 
reformist discourse that was available to her. In this way, important aspects of the 
Enlightenment—such as territorial expansion and scientific discovery—became central 
aspects of her legitimacy. 
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The Reforms of Catherine II 
Catherine’s reformist credentials necessarily had to be matched with deeds. The 
Legislative Commission of 1767 is an example of Catherine’s attempt to base the 
relationship between the autocrat and society on legal principles. As Catherine envisioned 
it, this commission “was to be much larger than any of its eighteenth-century 
predecessors, and the elected deputies themselves were to take part in drafting the code.” 
The deputies of the commission were to “explain the needs and problems of their 
communities, and to take part in the preparation of a new code of laws” based on the 
Empress’s instructions.94 Her instructions to the commission, the Nakaz, provided the 
rational and moral principles on which a new legal code was to be based, rather than 
prescriptive laws.95 In the Nakaz, Catherine insisted that “true End of Monarchy” is 
“[n]ot to deprive People of their natural Liberty; but to correct their Actions, in order to 
attain the supreme Good.”96 Liberties, however, could not be given to the entire 
population, since subjects’ reason and virtue first had to be cultivated, under the guidance 
of the reforming tsar. Regarding the premise of her own rule, Catherine emphasized 
restraint, for the autocrat should understand her own place and act “with self-limited and 
defined powers,” overseeing the machinery of the state.97 
In addition to the attempt to establish clear legal principles, the development of 
literary activities emerged as a priority of Catherine’s reign, as evidenced by her decree 
of 1783 which granted individuals the right to use a printing press without direct 
governmental permission. During this period the number of books being printed and sold 
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skyrocketed, and the reading public vastly expanded .98 Her reign also saw an increase of 
concerns over establishing linguistic standards and the creation of a literary language, as 
shown in various attempts at producing a comprehensive compilation of Russian 
grammar.99 
Isabel de Madariaga notes that “[i]n very few cases did the nobility rise to the 
formulations of their views in abstract political terms. This can be explained by the low 
cultural level, even illiteracy, still typical of the provincial noble...”100 Nevertheless, it 
was precisely this difference between the noble estate of the Russian Empire and the 
educated classes of western Europe that compelled Catherine to promote publishing and 
literary culture. Madariaga’s view that “the Legislative Commission was not intended to 
represent ‘the people’, let alone ‘the will of the people’”101 does not account for the way 
that eighteenth-century theories of autocracy understood the role of “the people.” As we 
have seen, Catherine’s first priority upon accession was to secure the support of the elite. 
Yet the support of the elite in an “elective monarchy” served as evidence that “[t]he 
people decided to choose another [monarch], with Catherine the embodiment of their 
will.” Elective monarchy here is not meant in the literal sense, but rather is meant to 
designate the sovereign whose reign is justified by popular consent and who embodies 
the consensus of the elite. Public opinion, then, was personified in Catherine herself—
much more so than under Elizabeth—and it was her duty to the state (as opposed to 
divine mandate) to enlighten her subjects. “Election—the ‘love’ of the people for her and 
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their ‘clear desire’ that she rule—provided Catherine the only basis for claiming to be a 
‘true sovereign.’”102 
The seeds of subjective equivalency that had been laid by Peter I had begun to 
take root under Catherine’s stewardship, and further, her legitimacy was contingent on a 
program of reform which sought to expand the institutions of the public sphere, 
represented primarily by literary culture. It is therefore understandable that under 
Catherine, by way of literary works, many of the ideas associated with the western 
European public sphere also permeated Russian society, such as those concerning 
subjective equivalency and domesticity.  
Another measure, the Statute on Provincial Administration in 1775, gave the 
nobility increased power in the provinces, although it did so by imposing on them legally 
binding responsibility, and by tying the provincial nobility more closely to the court’s 
interests. The Charter to the Nobility in 1785 abolished corporal punishment for the 
nobility, an exemption regarded as a privilege.103 This expanded on the trend of 
increasing privileges for the nobles estates set by Peter III, who had issued a manifesto in 
1762 freeing the noble elites from mandatory state service “on condition that they 
volunteered for service in time of war.”104 
Likewise in 1785, a measure was put forward aimed at establishing a new estate 
of “townspeople,” the Charter to the Towns. By this Charter, freed or escaped serfs living 
in provincial towns were enrolled in this estate, and this was done in connection with 
Catherine’s intention to encourage the formation of a “third estate” in the Russian 
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Empire.105 Although the Charter failed to create such an estate, merchants in the Russian 
Empire began to achieve greater social mobility by the second half of the eighteenth 
century. David Ransel, for instance, argues that a kind of “social elite” was formed 
“across class lines” thanks to “regular administrative, business and social interaction.”  
Using the Tolchenov family from the Moscow region as an example, Ransel argues that 
whereas earlier merchants had interacted mainly with “close relatives, business associates 
and the local clergy,” by Catherine’s time their social circles had “expanded to include an 
increasing number of noble officials and their families.”106 
Catherine’s relationship to the institutions of civic life saw two phases: the first, 
spanning from her accession and through the 1780s, was one of active support. The 
second phase, beginning in the late 1780s and continuing until her death, was one of 
ambivalence and sometimes repression. Catherine’s support for institutions of public life 
during the first period of her reign had far-reaching consequences. Coinciding with her 
promotion of publishing and literary life, Freemasonry emerged as a major influence 
among Russian elites. The first Masonic lodges in the Russian Empire were founded 
between 1750 and 1770. After 1770 there was “a dramatic increase in Masonic activity”: 
by 1790 between ninety and more than one hundred lodges were established. Although 
St. Petersburg and Moscow were the main hubs of Masonic activity, “more than half of 
all lodges were located in dozens of provincial cities and towns, particularly in ports 
where expatriate foreigners introduced their native habits and customs.”107 Catherine II 
disliked Freemasonry, but nevertheless she chose to express this view as an equal 
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participant with respect to other writers in the elite literary circle, publishing and staging 
her anti-Masonic plays anonymously. Although the “outpouring of public praise” that 
greeted her plays suggests that it was “no secret” who had authored them, the act of 
publishing her work anonymously gestured toward an emerging public sphere that was 
separating itself from the state.108 
The second phase of Catherine’s relationship to institutions of civic life began 
with the French Revolution, which marked a serious turning point in Catherine’s view of 
the advisability of her Enlightenment-influenced reforms. A series of events, including 
the beheading of Louis XVI in 1793, tempered her optimism on the subject of popular 
will; the civic and moral virtue of the population had clearly been overestimated, and the 
role of the autocrat was now to rein in the passions of the public.109 This period saw 
Catherine’s “gradual withdrawal of support from institutions of public life,” such as 
literary journals and public theater.110 
Catherine’s engagement with literary figures of her day extended far and wide. 
Historians have often interpreted Catherine’s writings as commands to her subjects on 
how to engage in belles letters, but this historiographical position has been challenged, 
particularly by W. Gareth Jones. Pointing to her debate over the nature of satire with 
Nikolai Novikov, a litterateur and publisher active during Catherine’s reign, Jones 
suggests that this episode demonstrated Catherine’s active engagement—without threat 
of punishment—with writers during the period before the French Revolution.111 
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Catherine viewed her role in the literary sphere as one of arbitration, not direct 
supervision. According to Jones, for most of Catherine’s reign the sovereign was seen as 
an ally to literary production, even for those with whom she disagreed.112 
Although Catherine never abandoned the right as Empress to intervene in public 
discussions of policy, her self-representation emphasized non-coercive involvement with 
public debate. In order to maintain the image of the tsar-reformer, so central to her 
legitimacy, Catherine acted as a mediator in civic life, careful not to be construed as a 
tyrant. In this capacity, her reforms were aimed at fostering those institutions of civic life 
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Gender and Civic Life during Catherine’s Reign 
The development of civic life in the Russian Empire had its consequences for 
gender as well as literature. In a letter to Voltaire, Catherine articulated her domestic 
vision for women of the empire, writing that “[w]e educate them with a view to making 
them the delight of their future families; we want them to be neither prudes, nor 
coquettes, but agreeable young ladies, capable of raising their own children and running 
their own homes.”113 
 Marriage for love obtained a newfound cultural value, and while “[m]arriages 
were sometimes arranged for interest (raschet),” it was recognized that they “were not 
ideal,” although “such marriages were not shameful” during this period.114 The reforms 
of the era had opened space for the privileged formation of the patriarchal conjugal 
family. As John Randolph shows in his study of the Bakunin family, “[a] new politics of 
private life was thus emerging in Tver Province by the time the Bakunins moved there in 
the early 1780s.” The rural estates were endowed with a new prestige, gaining an 
association with civic and moral cultivation. This was closely linked with the notion of 
empire, for during this period the elite “overcame their traditional suspiciousness of idle 
nobility to try to take advantage of the platform rural towns and estates offered for 
expanding the reach of imperial culture and its scenarios of power.”115 
During Catherine’s reign, Tver was “a laboratory for imperial politics. 
Specifically, the government wanted to work out mechanisms whereby the state could 
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enlighten the provinces—that is, mobilize them in pursuit of power, productivity, and 
increased prosperity.”116 The intimate life of the family, able to serve as an enlightening 
example to others, was understood by the autocrat as an avenue toward bringing the 
provinces more closely under the fold of the St. Petersburg administration. According to 
Randolph, “Catherine the Great and her advisers encouraged noble families to see their 
provincial private lives as an extension of the world of power and culture they had earlier 
known in the capitals.”117 Yet as Randolph points out: 
If, as seems to be the case, the domestic enlightenment for 
which the Bakunin family became so famous found its first 
inspiration in the civic idealism of the Catherinean era, 
there was certainly no guarantee that the moral dramas the 
family produced would conform to official expectations, or 
present roles that fit so comfortably within the empire’s 
existing social and political order.118  
 
Catherine’s memoirs, written after the French Revolution, worked to circumvent a 
discourse that would have positioned her primary duty as one of domesticity and would 
have figured women as inappropriate for the role of the autocrat. 
Catherine’s primary obligation, in her view, was not to love and obey her 
husband. She recalled thinking to herself as early as 1744 that she was “more or less 
indifferent” to Peter III, but “not to the crown of Russia.”119 Describing the days leading 
up to her wedding, Catherine wrote that she “grew more deeply melancholic” during this 
period. “My heart did not foresee great happiness; ambition alone sustained me. At the 
bottom of my soul I had something… that never for a single moment let me doubt that 
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sooner or later I would succeed in becoming the sovereign Empress of Russia in my own 
right.”120 
Positive references to marriage for love are scarce in the memoir. On one 
occasion she remembered an acquaintance being married in 1753. According to 
Catherine, her friend “was very pleased about this, and I was too; they married for love.” 
Her joy, however, immediately gave way to moral judgment. “But the truth was that this 
virtuous woman, who had loved her husband so much, had conceived a passion for Prince 
Peter Repnin and a quite marked aversion for her husband.”121 For Catherine, marriage 
for love was unstable and represented a victory of passion over reason. The female 
subject’s duty, then, was not defined by her particular function in and relationship to the 
family; beings were to be judged according to their inner virtue, regardless of biological 
sex. Thus, despite Catherine’s insistence on her obedience to her husband, she 
summarized her thought process leading up to the coup of 1762 as follows: “To put it 
more clearly, it was a question of perishing with him, or by him, or else of saving myself, 
my children and perhaps the state from the disaster that all this Prince’s moral and 
physical faculties promised.”122  
As a woman, her civic duty is tied into a larger structure which includes the 
sphere of public authority as well as any domestic domain. The gendered division of the 
public from the private, one in which women’s legitimate power must remain 
circumscribed firmly within the private bounds of domesticity, was clearly not operative 
in Catherine’s memoirs, although they were entrenched in her political program from the 
beginning of her reign and throughout the 1780s. Her memoirs, written after the French 
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Revolution, mark an effort to defend a discourse of gender which allowed her to 
legitimize herself, and the one sex model is clearly dominant over the two sex model in 






















Unintended Consequences: Gender and Literature among the Educated Elite 
But Catherine’s ambivalence regarding the discourse of the two sex model did not 
extend to the writers of the 1790s. Major literary figures of that decade, such as 
Alexander Radishchev (1749-1802) and Nikolai Karamzin (1766-1826), viewed feminine 
domesticity as natural and essential to the demands of any properly formed political 
program. These authors provide a particularly interesting point of contrast in light of the 
fact that they both published travelogues during the French Revolution: Radishchev’s 
Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow (1790) and Karamzin’s serialized Letters of a 
Russian Traveller (1791-1792). Yet as is well know, Radishchev was publicly 
condemned and sentenced to death, although his sentence was commuted, while 
Karamzin’s Letters launched what would be remembered as an illustrious literary—and 
later, academic—career.123 
In order to understand the contours of the Russian civic life under Catherine’s 
reign, we must examine the case of Radishchev and his public condemnation. What line, 
exactly, did Radishchev cross when he published Journey from St. Petersburg to 
Moscow? Allen McConnell views Radishchev’s “enthusiasm for popular revolutions in 
seventeenth-century Britain and contemporary America” as the cause of Catherine’s 
harsh reaction.124 During the French Revolution, Catherine also had Novikov arrested and 
imprisoned on account of his publications.125 But Novikov had been directly engaged in a 
long-standing and somewhat confrontational debate with Catherine, and he seemed an 
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obvious scapegoat. Radishchev, on the other hand, was not especially well known, and he 
himself condemned the ongoing events in France, where “everyone... is talking about 
liberty, when license and anarchy have reached the utmost possible limits.”126 
Radishchev used the language of freedom in a way that undermined the reformist 
discourse of legitimacy that underlay Catherine’s reign; having no recourse to dynastic 
legitimacy, she took this threat very seriously.  
In Journey, one of the narrator’s childhood friends declares that a “citizen,” 
regardless of social origins, “is and will always remain a man; and so long as he is a man, 
the law of nature, as an abundant wellspring of goodness, will never run dry in him, and 
whosoever dares wound him in his natural and inviolable rights is a criminal.”127 For 
Radishchev, the subject’s morality could not be guided by the autocrat. Morality was an 
innate principle, and any deviation from it, even that sanctioned by the authority of the 
state, was a violation of nature. Expressing Radishchev’s view that serfdom was such a 
violation, the narrator asks:  
What was the impelling force that caused men to establish a 
social order and voluntarily restrict their freedom of action? 
Reason will say, ‘Their own good’; the heart will say, 
‘Their own good’; the incorruptible civil law will saw, 
‘Their own good.’ We live in a society which has already 
passed through many stages of progress; therefore we have 
forgotten its original condition. But consider all new 
nations... in a state of nature. First, they regard enslavement 
as a crime; second, they subject only criminals or the 
enemy to the yoke of slavery. If we keep these concepts in 
mind, we will realize how far we have strayed from the aim 
of society, how far removed we still are from the ideal of 
social happiness.128 
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Radishchev was as critical of social inequality in general as of serfdom, and in his 
view, any attempt to institutionalize social difference constituted a step away from nature 
and a perversion of it. But Radishchev was also writing firmly within the sentimentalist 
tradition, which helped to entrench the two sex model by imagining the figure of the 
woman as a symbol of purity and tender innocence. What is most interesting about 
Journey is that its call for a return to nature entailed a turn to gender roles that resembled 
those of the patriarchal conjugal family. This view of nature and gender redefined 
civilization—represented in particular by city life and urbane, elite men who corrupt the 
purity of women—as a repressive force that curtailed the blossoming of true feelings that 
nourished the individual’s development. In Journey, when the narrator meets a peasant 
girl, Anna, she is immediately suspicious of him, but he reassures her, “I’m not a 
scoundrel and do not mean to insult or dishonor you. I love women because they embody 
my ideal of tenderness.” Radishchev’s narrator continues, “but most of all I love village 
or peasant women, because they are innocent of hypocrisy, do not put on the mask of 
pretended love, and when they do love, love sincerely and with their whole hearts.”129 
When Anna tells the narrator that her suitor, whom she is prevented from marrying by his 
greedy landlord, is planning to travel to St. Petersburg to look for work, the narrator 
exclaims, “do not let him go, dear Anyutushka, do not let him go! He will be going to his 
ruin. There he will learn to drink, to waste his money, to eat dainties, despise farm work, 
and worst of all, he will stop loving you.”130 Radishchev’s prescribed return to nature 
thus positions the purity of private rural life in opposition to the degradation of public 
urban life. The figure of the innocent woman is threatened by civilization itself, and this 
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purity, compromised by the perversion of the natural order that is autocracy, must be 
defended. Already, the two sex model operates in the imaginary of nature. A proto-
nationalist tone is also present here, as the lower classes of the country are clearly 
identified as having more “Russian” characteristics, as opposed to the effete nobility of 
the cities. 
Nikolai Karamzin, another writer heavily influenced by the sentimentalist 
tradition, also demonstrated a strong attachment to the two sex model. His depiction of 
the dichotomy of nature and civilization, however, was much more amenable to the 
reformist discourse of legitimacy so coveted by Catherine. For Karamzin, the threat of 
nature overcoming civilization, leaving only a bestial, anarchic disorder, necessitated a 
strong civilizing hand on the part of the elite. Only through self-conscious force can the 
subject recreate the world in his image, which will allow him to triumph over the chaos 
of nature. Karamzin stressed the ability of experience to tame passion and organize the 
subject’s impressions of the world. In Letters, upon arriving in London, the traveler asks 
the reader: “What if I had arrived in England straight from Russia without... visiting 
Germany, Switzerland, France? I think that the picture of England would have made an 
even stronger impression on my feelings and would have been much more novel.”131 For 
Karamzin, controlling the strength of impressions is vital because, as Vladimir Bilenkin 
puts it, “only reason can conceive absolute totality, which nature cannot provide nor the 
imagination apprehend.”132 Whereas Radishchev’s Journey links the state of nature to 
authenticity in contrast to deceitful artifice, Karamzin’s Letters refer to the journey that 
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preceded his arrival in London in order to suggest that his experience helps to control his 
passion. For Karamzin, in Schönle’s words, “[t]he business of art is not to gesture at 
something that exceeds it.”133 Karamzin’s opposition of reason to nature and his 
celebration of reason’s triumph over nature had especially poignant ramifications in the 
Russian context, since the ability of the monarch to progressively reform society was the 
basis of legitimacy for the autocracy. As Whittaker points out, Russian thinkers of the 
eighteenth century “imagined monarchs fighting a constant battle between the forces of 
virtue (often, truth or reason) and passion.”134 
Karamzin’s insistence that mankind had the ability to triumph over the forces of 
nature became especially significant in his comparison of Peter I to Louis XIV. 
Contemplating a monument to the French king, the remarks that, “[h]is [Louis XIV’s] 
subjects glorified Louis; Peter glorified his subjects... The former I respect as a strong 
king; the latter I esteem as a great man, a hero, a benefactor of mankind—and as my own 
personal benefactor.” He describes the statue of Peter I in St. Petersburg, commissioned 
by Catherine and completed in 1782, and extols the rough stone base, “since this stone 
serves as a stirring image of the state Russia was in before the times of her transformer.” 
Finally, he uses the humanity of Peter to glorify Catherine II. “No less pleasing to me is 
the short, powerful and allusive inscription: Catherine the Second to Peter the First. 
What is written on the monument of the French king I did not read.” The torch of 
progress that was ignited by Peter I was thus passed by Karamzin to Catherine II. Peter, 
unlike Louis, is more man than king, but this status merits his comparison with a “radiant 
god of light” who “illuminated the deep darkness around himself,” in contrast to Louis 
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XIV, who only “partly facilitated the successes of the enlightenment.”135 For Karamzin, 
autocracy was the safeguard of reason and temperance against the overwhelming force of 
passion, and it was the autocrat—specifically in the discourse of subjective 
equivalency—that ensured the continued beneficence of civilization. 
It is with this in mind that the traveler offers a scathing portrait of English society 
during his trip to London. Describing a member of parliament, he addresses the reader 
directly:  
You, my friends, are acquainted with the history of this 
man, who for several years played a famous role in 
England; he was the terrible opponent to the ministry—to 
parliament itself—and the idol of the people. But 
notwithstanding his pretensions to patriotism, he thought 
solely about his personal gains and behaved like a scourge 
only in order to receive a lucrative position…136  
 
Karamzin’s view of nature was used to dismiss the political system of England, based on 
constitutional monarchy, as a threat to civic virtue. For him, the threat of untamed nature 
overcoming civilization necessitates protection by the strong hand of the enlightened 
autocrat. 
Karamzin saw in England the result of the lack of restraints on the passions that 
were unleashed by the predominance of market forces. In the same letter, entitled 
“Parliamentary Elections,” the traveler goes on to describe almost total social disorder in 
England, in which “a person will never be imprisoned on the suspicion that he is a thief; 
it is necessary to catch him in the act and to provide witnesses; otherwise you are in for 
trouble if you should bring an accusation against him without unassailable legal 
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proof.”137 He also condemns the excesses of the French Revolution, exclaiming that 
“[o]nce people have become convinced that virtue is necessary for their own personal 
happiness, then the Golden Age will begin, and man will enjoy the peaceful benefaction 
of life under every government.” Only through discipline and careful taming of the 
passions could society progress. Finally, the traveler invokes the divine order that 
inscribed autocracy: “Let us give ourselves and entrust ourselves, my friends, to the 
power of providence, whose plan is determined, and who holds in his hand the hearts of 
rulers—and that is enough.”138 
For Karamzin, the goal for Russia was not to become more like western Europe, 
although both Russians and western Europeans shared an attachment to the notions of 
progress and to the importance of establishing social order in the spirit of the 
Enlightenment. Russians like Karamzin saw in the autocracy a promise of progressive 
change without the threat of social degeneration (as described in England) or a complete 
breakdown of social order (as described in France). For Karamzin, civic life in Russia 
needed to be defended from the forces of self-interest associated with the market. As 
Kahn points out, by “privileging the patriarchal and emphasising uxorious 
subordination,” Karamzin “makes a plea for a new dynamic” against the notion that “new 
hierarchies in the commercial sphere [must] correspond to analogous domestic 
hierarchies.” In Karamzin’s view, healthy civic life depends on “sociability, as practiced 
and regulated in close familial relations honed by an intelligent spouse,” and his 
observations of western European civic life revealed to him a dangerous inattention to the 
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institution of the family. As Kahn describes it, Karamzin viewed the family as “corrective 
and inter-dependent part” of a properly functioning public.139 
The patriarchal conjugal family was central to Karamzin’s view of the importance 
of civilization. For him, the family was the setting for moral and civic cultivation, and he 
contrasted the morality cultivated by the family to the arbitrary forces of the market in 
western Europe. He shared with Radishchev a fear of the perversion of nature by 
civilization, and the events in France became for Karamzin a vivid example of that 
perversion. Thus, Karamzin “forges an association between the family and nature” in 
order to undercut the notion, already gaining ground in western Europe, that “the rise of 
the bourgeois economic model… enhances in parallel the world of the family, giving 
importance to individual relations within an economic and social unit that is further 
reinforced by emotional and kinship bonds.” The vice and social degeneration that was 
visible in the urban areas of western Europe could be combated only by the social 
structure of the family, for “[r]egulation by the public sphere of sexuality protects the 
private world of the family, the natural locus of affections” from “the spread of 
depravity.”140 This is why Karamzin was so insistent about the domestic role of women, 
who must hold the family together. As he wrote in letter 150, “Domestic Life”:  
I have always thought that the furthest successes of 
Enlightenment should bind people more to domestic life. Is 
it not spiritual emptiness that attracts us to dissipation? The 
first business of true philosophy is to turn a man to the 
unchanging pleasures of nature. When the head and heart 
are occupied at home in a pleasant manner; where there is a 
book in hand, a sweet wife nearby, beautiful children 
around, would one wish to go to a ball, or to a large 
dinner?141  
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Women, however, were prevented from reaching this domestic bliss by an 
aristocratic public that lacks innocence, purity, and honesty. “First the young wife wishes 
simply to have the general regard for her beauty or gracefulness in order to justify the 
husband’s choice (so she thinks); but then a desire is born in her to please one 
connoisseur more than another… to intrigue, to attract, to give hope.” This leads to 
disastrous effects, “and then—Poor husband! Poor children!” Nevertheless, it is “[s]he 
herself” who “is unhappiest of all.” The misplaced faith in self-interest in the socio-
economic structure of western Europe is not only a threat to autocracy; it is a threat to the 
family itself. “I am speaking about women,” Karamzin writes,  
because it is more pleasant to my heart to be occupied with 
them…but most of the blame, without any doubt, is on the 
side of men, who are unable to use their morals for mutual 
happiness and prefer to be obnoxious slaves rather than 
intelligent, polite and charming masters of the tender sex 
that was created to charm and not to rule (for strength has 
no need for charm).142  
 
Catherine’s approbation of a gendered division of domestic and public life was 
thus a reflection of this emerging discourse of feminine domesticity. Radishchev himself 
made no explicit claims regarding the inability of women to rule, although Karamzin did. 
The latter’s understanding of the relationship between nature and civilization promoted 
autocracy as a desirable political model. In any case, the enlightened character of the 
autocracy and the sovereign was not up for debate, but Catherine was willing to engage 
on the issue of gender, re-asserting a flexible representation of sex against the 
increasingly rigid discourse that had taken hold of figures like Radischchev and 
Karamzin. Catherine’s memoirs can be understood as an attempt to assert her role as 
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autocrat, outside of the bounds of domesticity, and to defend her right to rule as a woman 
in a time when public debates increasingly brought into question women’s ability to do 
so. 
 Radishchev envisioned that through reason and “mutual feeling” mankind could 
return to a “natural” state of universal brotherhood. For him, the autocracy represented a 
distortion of nature that was aligned with the darkness and superstition condemned by 
Enlightenment thinkers. Karamzin, on the other hand, saw political stability and social 
order as entirely contingent on civilization’s ability to fend off the powerful forces of 
nature. For him, creating a reading public would help tame the passions of uncultivated 
human nature, as literature was to lead the reading subject toward an appreciation of 
beauty that would nevertheless be contained within the bounds of reason. Karamzin’s 
views thus fell in line with those of Catherine, whose reforms were aimed, in part, at the 
expansion of the reading public. Radishchev’s crime was not criticizing serfdom; it was 
questioning the cosmology and philosophy of history that supported the image of the 
reforming tsar as the center of progress and authority. With Journey, Radishchev 
transgressed the boundary of the Russian public sphere, and this was the source of his 
condemnation. 
 Catherine’s public condemnation of Radishchev is often seen as evidence of the 
lack of a “public sphere” in the Russian context. He was initially sentenced to death, and 
he was stripped of his status as a noblemen. But Catherine took heed of the limitations 
imposed on her by the law, and changed his sentence to ten years of exile labor in 
Siberia. Catherine’s legitimacy was too dependent on her image as a reforming tsar, and 
ultimately, she had to reckon with the ban on corporal punishment established by her 
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Charter to the Nobility in 1785. Radishchev was made to appear publically in chains, “a 
mark of humiliation,” and was kept in his fetters throughout his journey to Siberia.143 
Indeed, this would seem to represent an intervention by an autocrat into the world of 
letters, and it is a sure breach of any principle of subjective equivalency. Nevertheless, 
attention to how constructions of gender in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries in the Russian Empire shaped the reading public demonstrates the extent to 
which the exchange of ideas and the shaping of opinions were no less dynamic than they 
were in western Europe, at least by the time of Catherine’s reforms. Exploring not only 
the social but also the political implications of the dominance of the two sex model shows 
the inadequacy of an approach that is attentive only to the relationship between the 
autocrat and her subjects. 
Karamzin and Radishchev shared something important: the patriarchal conjugal 
family was for both of them a relationship inscribed in nature. The discourse of 
incommensurable sexual difference had so taken hold by the 1790s that two thinkers with 
diametrically opposed views of the proper relationship between civilization and nature 
both located the patriarchal conjugal family squarely in the realm of the natural. No 
matter how fiercely Catherine attempted to reassert the viability of the one sex model in 
her self-representation, incommensurable difference had taken hold to the point that her 
androgynous presentation on the basis of the one sex model could no longer work to 
establish her reformist legitimacy. The Russian Empire would never again have a woman 
as sovereign. 
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 Civic life in the Russian Empire evolved differently from that in western Europe. 
Catherine retained the authority of the sovereign to intervene and repress opinion. 
Nevertheless, through active dissemination of literary exchanges certain kinds of 
consensus views developed over which Catherine had no control, particularly with regard 
to gender and the family. The emergence of these consensus views on gender 
demonstrates the effective existence of a public sphere in this period. This is because 
these views, which developed in the Russian context in connection with ongoing 
discussions over the nature of publicity and privateness, came to be disseminated in a 
way that was largely due to the educated elite’s own activities. Further, demonstrating 
their power over political authority, these consensus views on gender and family, based 
on the two sex model, came back to discredit Catherine and her legacy by infusing the 
discourses of legitimacy after her reign with constructions of gender that made 
domesticity the only conceivable role for women. 
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Monarchy after Catherine II 
 Upon Catherine’s death in 1796, her son came to power as Paul I. During 
Catherine’s reign, Paul had been closely associated with Nikita Panin, a figure who was 
involved in Catherine’s coup in 1762 and whose extensive network of loyal supporters 
formed something of an opposition to Catherine’s political program during the 1780s. 
Paul and Panin also shared close ties to the Freemasons, who excluded women from their 
membership. Throughout Catherine’s reign, both were implicated in attempts to make use 
of connections with elites in western and northern Europe in order to undermine 
Catherine’s power at home.144 Many major literary figures, including Nikolai Karamzin 
and Nikolai Novikov, also shared close ties—if not membership—with the Freemasons, 
and it is clear that this political tie to oppositional figures such as Panin was part of 
Catherine’s sometimes hostile relationship with Masonic writers, including her 
condemnation of Novikov.145 
 Paul’s accession represented a re-eruption of the discourse of dynastic legitimacy 
in the Russian Empire. He was the son of Catherine, but more significantly, Paul was the 
great-grandson of Peter I and the son of Peter III.  His accession was initially greeted 
with a positive reception on the part of the nobility, who had been displeased with 
Catherine’s increasingly reactionary politics after the beheading of Louis XVI. For the 
elite, Paul represented “Masonic ideals of political morality,” and whereas Catherine’s 
attitude in the 1790s had been seen as unpredictable and capricious, Paul’s self-
representation as masculine and decisive boded well. Not only in his rhetoric, but legally, 
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he reconstituted autocratic legitimacy as dynastic in his new succession law, which 
reestablished primogeniture for the throne for the first time since the reign of Peter I, with 
preference for male over female heirs.146 His relationship with the nobility eventually 
soured however, as the latter came to dislike his authoritarian rhetoric and his dismissal 
of their role in the legitimization of the monarch’s power; his succession law was also 
designed to prevent an intervention on the part of the elite in the accession of a hereditary 
heir.147  
A coup in 1801 brought to power Paul’s son—and Catherine’s grandson—
Alexander I. Paul had come to be seen as a tyrant, whom the nobility “felt obliged to 
stop” according to their notions of duty to the state and to society.148 Alexander’s reign 
entailed a rejection of the authoritarian representation of monarchy espoused by Paul, but 
nevertheless it was not a return to the discourse of monarchy promoted by Catherine. 
When Alexander issued an accession manifesto on the first day of his reign, it “did not 
emphasize the break with the previous reign. Indeed, responsibility for the death was 
assigned to the ‘Divine Fates’ that had brought an end to his father’s life ‘suddenly with 
an apoplectic stroke.’ The new emperor proclaimed that he was ascending the throne by 
heredity.”149 With this continued deployment of the discourse of dynastic legitimacy, 
certain aspects of the representation of monarchy that came into being under Paul were 
retained by Alexander, particularly regarding gender and the family. 
 The new emphasis on primogeniture as the basis of legitimacy under Paul also 
reconstituted the representation of monarchy on the basis of the two sex model. In the 
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public institutions created under Catherine, her son Paul and her grandson Alexander had 
been educated in a way that “had impressed them with their obligation to act as men, 
following the examples of the great leaders of history.”150 When Paul came to power in 
1796, the “imperial family,” suddenly alive with symbolic power, “attended a ceremony 
of disinterment of Peter III,” where “Paul staged the posthumous coronation of Peter III 
by placing the imperial crown on his dead father’s casket. Then the imperial family 
returned to the Winter Palace,” where they “lifted Catherine’s corpse” and “conferred [a] 
small crown on the head of Catherine, the same crown that Peter the Great had placed on 
the head of Catherine I.”151 The androgynous image so carefully cultivated by Catherine 
the Great, in which she could represent simultaneously her masculinity and femininity, 
was thus ritually effaced immediately upon her death. The program of reform pursued by 
Catherine, one which emphasized the family as the basis of society and which strove to 
cultivate domestic virtue in women, overpowered her self-representation as an 
androgynous, competent ruler. 
The legacy of Catherine’s gender representation would continue to act as a 
negative model of gender transgression for future generations of Russians. As Wortman 
shows, Empresses of the nineteenth century, in Russia and elsewhere, “became symbols 
of royalty’s adoption of the familial values of the middle class.” In the nineteenth 
century, where the image of the imperial family became so intertwined with monarchical 
legitimacy, Catherine’s consistent recourse to a one sex model in her public 
legitimization came to represent a threat to the moral cultivation of the body politic.152 
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Indeed, Catherine became of symbol of gender transgression throughout Europe, and was 
immortalized as the inspiration of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s Venus in Furs in 1870, 
where the “specifically Slavic fantasy” of “the personification of voluptuous cruelty” 
took its inspiration from the eighteenth-century empress.153 
The “imperial family,” from Paul’s time forward, became central to the 
representation of power in Russian Monarchy. This process entailed a transition whereby 
the empress was conceived not “as a political rival,” but as “a helpful member of the 
imperial family.”154 In contrast to Catherine, who took care to keep her son and grandson 
apart lest they form a political alliance against her, Paul mandated frequent gatherings 
where the entire imperial family was presented to an audience. Birthdays and name days 
of members of the imperial family were publically celebrated as “imperial days,” and the 
highly formal etiquette of these functions was “devised by the empress,” Paul’s wife.155 
The centrality of the family in representations of the monarchy extended into the 
reign of Alexander I, and went hand in hand with an increased valorization of the family. 
The writer Sergei Glinka (1774-1847), who operated the periodical Russian Messenger 
from 1808 until 1812, understood women “as an important barometer of society’s 
health,” and the extent to which their “domestic, familial” virtues were cultivated 
determined the extent to which the body politic was functioning properly. He viewed the 
“modest, nurturing,” and “maternal” qualities of women as the primary barrier against the 
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dangers of “fashion” and “passions,” and saw the disintegration of the family in 
revolutionary France as the cause of the country’s descent “into barbarism.”156 
To sum up, monarchy after Catherine’s death tended to include the image of the 
imperial family in its representations of legitimacy. This was due in part to the 
institutions of civic life fostered by Catherine, but was also a result of the public 
discussions regarding civic virtue and moral cultivation that had become widespread 
among the elite. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the notion of feminine 
domesticity had permeated the representation of the court, and future empresses would 
represent that domesticity to the public. Indeed, feminine domesticity came to be 
identified as a national characteristic, and appeals to that domesticity were deployed by 
Russian thinkers to differentiate themselves from those of western Europe. 
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Some Perspectives on Feminine Domesticity 
Many noble women had also come to understand their social role as primarily 
domestic and maternal by the time of Alexander’s reign. The ideals of femininity extolled 
by figures like Radishchev and Karamzin had been largely adopted by the nobility, who 
began to see the family as the source of a distinctly Russian moral principle. The 
memoirs of Anna Labzina, for example, documented her internal struggles over her 
relationship with her husband, a lecherous and impious man. She viewed obedience to 
her husband as her domestic duty, while at the same time insisting that “no one can force 
love.”157  Nevertheless, she recorded heeding her mother’s advice to “[l]ove your 
husband with a pure and fervent love, obey him in everything; you will not be submitting 
to him but to God, for God has given him to you and made him your master.”158 Her 
memoirs reveal the extent to which the valorization of women’s domesticity had been 
adopted by a relatively unknown, provincial noblewoman. The text, written around 1810, 
but documenting events during Catherine’s reign in the 1770s and 1780s, reflects the 
shifting cultural construction of domesticity, femininity, and the family after Catherine’s 
death. 
Born in 1756 near Ekaterinburg, she married twice, but her memoirs document 
only her first marriage to Alexander Karamyshev, a well-educated nobleman who worked 
for the College of Mines.159 She was a member of the middling nobility; her family was 
of relatively modest means, and they did not enjoy especially close ties to the court. Her 
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memoirs reflect strong tension between her domestic duty to obey her husband and her 
belief in marriage as consensual union between man and woman. She believed that love 
should be authentic, yet marriage seemed to have given love’s authenticity a different 
meaning. She claimed that although she was not naturally inclined to love her first 
husband, she put forward her best effort to gain his love, which resulted in his beginning 
“to behave better and more affectionately toward me.” On her part, Labzina asserted that 
she too “started to love him.”160 
 As an obedient wife, her happiness was increasingly identified with the family’s 
domicile. After having settled into a new home, Labzina was ecstatic to see that her 
husband had built a new garden outside of their house, writing, “I began to thank my 
husband and was so joyful at this unexpected event that I didn’t believe it myself: was I 
dreaming?” Her excitement was also driven by display of their domestic tranquility, and 
she related with glee that “the people walking by all stopped and looked at it with 
amazement.”161 
She also exhibited a kind of authority within the home, and the bedroom that she 
shared with her husband was represented as a private space. When one of her husband’s 
friends—a superior by social status—inappropriately approached her in her bedchamber, 
she asked him, “have you forgotten where you are? How dare you come in here, where 
no one is allowed but my husband and me!” She was also perturbed that she could be 
implicated in morally questionable activities, telling her husband’s friend, Nartov, that 
although he had corrupted her husband, “you may not show disrespect to me!” Nartov 
was indignant, and demanded that Karamyshev reprimand his wife. Labzina’s position in 
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the house, however, endowed her with domestic authority, and she fired back, “I know 
very well with whom I am speaking. We have a higher authority to whom I can turn, who 
is also superior to you!” The superior authority here refers, of course, to God, but was 
also, apparently, meant literally. In the following passages she successfully petitioned 
Prince Potemkin in order to avoid any wrath from Nartov.162 Her appeal to domestic 
authority was also tied to a belief that women had an innate understanding of morality 
that was specifically feminine. Her husband was annoyed by her moralistic reprimands 
against his sexual activities, and she described him telling her that “it was those stupid 
women who raised you who gave you these ideas, and your head is filled with every kind 
of nonsense.” Labzina replied indignantly to him, saying “[y]ou say that the stupid 
women who raised me taught me this stupidity. So be it! May the Lord help me carry out 
all their lessons.”163 
By 1810, when Labzina wrote her memoir, this association between women and 
an innate understanding of morality had begun to be identified with the Russian national 
character, and the notion of feminine domesticity was deployed in order to differentiate 
Russia from western nations. Sergei Glinka’s Russian Messenger, published during the 
period when Labzina wrote her memoirs, reimagined the pre-Petrine period as a time of 
domestic bliss in which “tsars, nobles, peasants, young people and women had all 
understood their duties to one another and to God.”164 He admonished aristocratic women 
who failed to breastfeed their children, claiming that this was a symptom of 
“subservience to ‘fashion’ and ‘passions,’” and believed that maintaining a domestic role 
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for women would lead to the cultivation of virtue in the Russian Empire.165 In Glinka’s 
view, the influence of the French philosophes of the eighteenth century were to blame for 
this moral degeneration in the Russian Empire, even as the values that he prescribed 
“sound suspiciously like the values advocated by Enlightenment thinkers.”166 The 
valorization of domesticity was, for Glinka, the key to combating unwanted foreign 
influence. 
Labzina seemed to share this suspicion of foreign culture as a threat to the virtues 
of domesticity when she alluded to a new kind of book that had begun to circulate, and 
that threatened to corrupt and demoralize. She noted that up until a certain time “I had 
never had the misfortune of reading a novel (roman), and I didn’t even know the 
word.”167 A well connected superior of her husband, and a mentor figure to Labzina, once 
warned her to “[b]eware of reading novels. They will not do you any good and they can 
bring you harm.”168 This admission of her lack of interest in novels can be understood in 
relation to her self-conscious rejection of the western-style courts of Russian monarchs, 
where “the animating myth of Russian monarch from the fifteenth to the late nineteenth 
centuries associated the ruler and the elite with foreign images of political power.”169 Her 
resistance to the novel takes on a native, anti-foreign quality. The domestic function of 
the family was no longer viewed as a foreign import on which subjects of the Russian 
Empire felt compelled to model themselves. On the contrary, Labzina’s role as a woman 
safeguarded the authentic, virtuous Russian character from a corrupting, foreign 
influence. 
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 Glinka’s primary reason for defending the institution of the family had to do with 
his conception of a social order based on a united and organic society. He attributed the 
alienation of the noble estate from the peasantry to moral degeneration. The Russian 
Messenger, therefore, aimed “to speak to all strata of society.”170 For Glinka, “the only 
good society was one governed by kind, humane individuals, not one ruled by impersonal 
laws or institutions.”171 In the absence of a discourse of social difference that viewed the 
elite as innately and naturally superior, the moral cultivation of the family was necessary 
in order to bring society into an organic unity, where the nobility would act as a moral 
example for the lower classes. This is why, although Glinka refused to own serfs, he 
never questioned the viability of the autocracy as the best form of government for the 
Russian Empire. With the proper moral cultivation and with the inclusion of the 
cultivation of domestic virtue, the Russian Empire would prosper where western Europe 
had descended into chaos.  
It is important to note here that Labzina’s memoirs were meant as an instruction. 
Thus, Labzina’s depiction of herself as a passionless, virginal being—in contrast to her 
lecherous husband—fits squarely into the framework of the two sex model that defined 
the private counterpart to the bourgeois public sphere of Russia’s western neighbors. 
Indeed, her passionlessness was morally good. Recalling her time visiting an estate, 
Labzina remembered, “how contented my heart was then! My conscience did not 
reproach me for anything. Even my thoughts were pure, and my husband’s shameful 
transgressions against me affected me less. It made me joyful to know that he could not 
                                               
170 Martin, “The Family Model of Society and Russian National Identity in Sergei N. Glinka’s Russian 
Messenger (1808-1812),” 47. 
171 Ibid., 49. 
71 
reproach me for anything.”172 The memoir then ended with an explosive monologue in 
which she declared that she would leave her husband because of his indiscretions. “My 
main fault,” she wrote, “has been that I have put up with everything... And after all of this 
he says he loves me! I find this kind of love incomprehensible. At least I do not know 
how to love in this way!”173 Although she does seem to have extended her identity 
beyond that of the good wife who is ultimately only obedient to her husband, her 
memoirs as a whole portrayed her view of domesticity as the primary point of interest in 
her life. If the events depicted in this text had seemed to Labzina entirely trivial and 
unsuited for a reading public, it seems odd that she should have taken the time to write 
them, particularly considering the almost complete absence of memoirs in Russia written 
by women.174 Given her ascetic tendencies, it is doubtful that she conceived of her 
reading and writing as an act of “conspicuous consumption,” as Habermas describes pre-
modern literary exchange based on patronage networks.175 Indeed, Marker and May 
claim that “by the time she wrote the memoir she clearly saw her story as an important 
moral lesson for others.”176 It was this sort of moral example, that of a feminine 
privateness, that in Glinka’s view would offer the reading public an opportunity for moral 
and civic cultivation in the body politic. 
Andreas Schönle argues that the literary and intellectual production of the Russian 
Empire in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries bore witness to what he has 
called “the scare of the self,” in which the notion of the private self never fully 
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developed, leaving the civic life of the Russian Empire distinct from that of western 
European states in its lack of regard for individual rights, such as security of property and 
person. According to Schönle, the strict prescriptive norms of social etiquette and the 
constant self-policing of fashion and affect “tended... to obliterate whatever sense of 
private self could unify the personality.”177 Focusing on sentimentalist travelogues—like 
those of Radishchev and Karamzin, he posits that the political imaginary was “swept by a 
dream of communalism” where the “community is no longer an organism that fosters the 
emergence of individual talents and aspirations but one that levels velleities of 
singularity. Along with the sense of individual selfhood goes the need for privacy.”178 
As Schönle quite aptly points out, no legal safeguards for property, the basis of 
the private sphere’s interest in the public, emerged in the Russian Empire.179 Yet as we 
have seen, figures like Karamzin and Radishchev viewed the family itself as a safeguard 
against and excessive valorization of privateness, which opens the door to self-interest. 
As an analysis of gender in the Russian Empire shows, the call for an “informal 
collective” does not necessarily preclude a sense of domestic privacy. Historians of 
western Europe often argue that the arbitrary power invested in the autocrat of the 
Russian Empire hampered the proper functioning of the public sphere. But many 
eighteenth-century Russian voices such as those of Karamzin and Catherine believed that 
only autocratic power, subjugated to education and reason, could correct the arbitrary 
power of market forces, which, if left unchecked, risked causing social and cultural 
degeneration. 
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Schönle references Denis Fonvizin’s play The Minor (1782), in order to argue that 
“the nobility’s right to privacy against encroachments by the state collided with the right 
of individuals or groups to be protected against invasions of their private spheres by 
representatives of the nobility.” Yet, as he also points out, the entire play revolves around 
the state intervening in a situation where a young woman demands to exercise her right to 
honest love. “Sofiia,” the young woman, “sees her privacy, notably her freedom to 
choose her own husband, endangered by Mrs. Prostakova, who wants to force Sofiia to 
marry her son. To uphold her privacy, Sofiia needs and ultimately receives help from the 
state in the guise of Pravdin, who is dispatched by a state commission to confiscate Mrs. 
Prostakova’s estate.”180 Yet this valorization of the family points precisely to the 
indigenous character of the Russian public sphere. In the words of Kahn, for example, 
Karamzin’s position “reverses a conclusion of Habermas.” For Kahn, Karamzin’s text 
works to argue “that the natural economy of the affections as embodied in familial 
relations should be the paradigm for social interaction,” which clearly complicates 
Habermas’s claim that the patriarchal conjugal family arose as a response to the new 
horizontal economic dependencies of the emerging market economy.181 Fonvizin’s play 
demonstrates the important role of the family in regards to the public sphere for thinkers 
of this period; as the source of domesticity and civic virtue, the state had to intervene to 
safeguard society against passion and self-interest. 
In the Russian Empire, one of the effects of the Napoleonic Wars, which ended in 
1815, was a further entrenchment of the ideals of domesticity among the Russian elites 
and across class boundaries. In order to maintain loyalty and raise morale among soldiers 
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and officers in the war, Alexander I was compelled to call “on the principle of popular 
sovereignty… to rally national feeling against Napoleon’s forces.”  The bourgeois ideals 
of honesty, transparency and modesty increasingly worked their way into representations 
of monarchy, and “an affection of simplicity and equality replaced resplendent majesty as 
a royal ideal.” Such ideals were no longer conceived as innate in rulers, but as cultivated 
virtues which would be copied from the example of the monarch. According to Wortman, 
these virtues were “demonstrated in the monarch’s private life, and particularly in the 
realm of the family,” further drawing on the dynastic discourse of legitimacy to shore up 
the example of moral virtue from above.182 
As Labzina’s memoirs show, a sense of “self” was clearly operative at the level of 
gender identity, and her understanding of her own role in society was very much defined 
by her status as a woman: domestic, moral, and passionless. The extent to which the 
valorization of domesticity had permeated the Russian Empire by the reign of Alexander 
I is demonstrated in the memoirs of Nadezhda Durova (1783-1866), who disguised 
herself as a man in order to fight in the Napoleonic Wars. The memoirs detail Durova’s 
transgression of prescribed gender roles. Durova came from the provincial nobility in the 
Smolensk region.183 Although her family ran an estate, the Durovs were rather 
insignificant in the political sphere. This was typical for much of the nobility during the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. According to Madariaga, “the provincial 
nobility lived perhaps in a little ‘nest’ or group of houses in a village of which they each 
owned a small share... [T]heir dwellings were often little more than wooden huts, with 
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two low dark rooms; walls and ceilings had no form of decoration other than... icons.”184 
Her family had financial troubles, and her father remarked that if she had been born a 
boy, “I shouldn’t have to worry about my old days; he would be my staff in the evening 
of my days.”185 She began an unhappy marriage at the age of sixteen, and ran away from 
home without the permission of her husband at the age of twenty three in order to join the 
military.   
The text of Cavalry Maiden was completed in 1836.186 It documents her 
experiences—some of which are verifiable—fighting in campaigns against Napoleon in 
Prussia, Lithuania and in European Russia. It also includes unverifiable anecdotes and 
stories that she heard along the way, one of which will be discussed later, and which were 
probably subject to literary embellishment if they had any basis in fact at all. In 1836, 
Durova had her manuscript sent to Alexander Pushkin through a family member.187 It 
seems that she sent it not out of an expectation that it would be published, but rather out 
of a hope that Pushkin would use the material to create “something quite entertaining for 
our countrywomen [to read].”188 To her surprise, Pushkin offered to publish the 
manuscript at his own expense. In a letter to Durova’s uncle, Pushkin expressed his 
confidence that “the Notes in their entirety will likely meet with success after I announce 
(potrubliu) them in my journal,” for he found the writing to be “delightful, lively, 
original, [and] its style beautiful. Its success is without doubt.”189 
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 Durova was flattered by Pushkin’s praise of her work, but she voiced concern 
over his plan to publish the Notes under her birth name, Nadezhda Durova. She was 
hoping that the manuscript would be published anonymously so that it would not be 
publicly known that she was a woman, or that she was personally connected to the story, 
claiming that “the public (publika) doesn’t know anything [about the Notes].” Referring 
to Pushkin by his patronymic, she wrote that “[t]he name by which you called me, 
gracious sir Alexander Sergeevich, in your forward, makes me uneasy. Is there not some 
way to alleviate this sorrow?” Instead of her name, she asked that the Notes be published 
as those “of a Russian Amazon, known under the name of Alexandrov.”190 But Pushkin 
was insistent, and urged her to “be brave—enter the literary vocation as valiantly as you 
did the [military] one that brought you fame.”191 
What is most striking about these letters is the fact that both Durova and Pushkin 
continually used masculine proper names, adjectival forms and pronouns in reference to 
Durova, despite the fact that Pushkin was aware of her biological sex. Pushkin always 
addressed Durova as “Alexander Alexandrov” in correspondence about her work, which 
frankly discussed her adoption of a male identity when she left to join the military. 
Pushkin’s only references to Durova’s legal name were made in regard to attribution of 
authorship upon publication. The Notes themselves consistently evoked tension between 
masculine and feminine pronouns and their qualifiers. Durova, as narrator, used only 
feminine adjectives in reference to herself, except where she related direct quotes or 
dialogue with others, in which case she referred to herself using masculine forms, as she 
would have in real life. 
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Recounting the first time she returned from the army to visit her father, Durova 
wrote that the servants at her family home were confused by her use of masculine forms 
in reference to herself. The servant kept calling Durova “miss,” according to Notes, and 
then as an aside to herself the servant interjected, “[m]aybe you shouldn’t call her ‘miss’ 
anymore. Well, it’ll take a while to get used to.” A moment later, the servant asked 
Durova, “But what do they call you now, miss? I can hear that you don’t talk the way you 
used to.” Durova responded, “[c]all me just what every one else does,” prompting the 
servant’s flustered reply, “[b]ut what are the others going to call you, ma’am—sir! 
Excuse me...” The servant used the formal second person pronoun, vy, the standard, and 
non-gender specific form for addressing a superior, which allowed the servant to not 
choose the gender by which she referred to Durova in direct conversations. Her father 
continued to refer to her using feminine forms, but her younger brother, by Durova’s 
account, was unsure of how to respond to the situation: “He had spent a long time 
conferring with Nanny about the proper way to greet me: should he just bow or kiss my 
hand? When Nanny told him he should do whatever he wished, he came running at once 
and threw himself into my arms.”192 
Durova’s rejection of a femininity that would have circumscribed her role as 
entirely domestic does not take the form of Catherine’s, who was able to represent herself 
as androgynous and who could deploy both masculine and feminine characteristics in her 
self-representation. Durova, by contrast, was obligated to choose between two poles of 
incommensurable difference. On the one hand, she operated socially as a man, and this 
masculine position was maintained in society even by those who knew of her biological 
sex. This is in contrast to Catherine, who was referred to by feminine pronouns. On the 
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other hand, it was always known, and it was a source of discomfort for those who knew, 
that Durova was a woman beneath her masculine presentation. These anxieties produced 
by the discrepancy between Durova’s sex and gender would not have been possible up 
until the rise of the two sex model in the eighteenth century. As Laqueur demonstrates, 
no distinction between social gender and biological sex was imaginable under the one sex 
model, since the body itself was a representation of status, not defined by its difference 
from the other sex. This novel demarcation of biological sex from social gender went 
hand in hand with new political representations that arose with literary discourses 
promoting the patriarchal conjugal family. The notion of incommensurable biological 
difference was also a precondition for the new cultural and political significance of love, 
which redefined the family by positing that the union of man and wife must be uncoerced 
and consensual. As Laqueur points out, claims of the political, social and cultural 
significance of love are “immediately met by the counterargument that someone has to be 
in charge of the family and that someone is the male, because of his ‘greater force of 
mind and body.’”193 Durova could earn a masculine social position through her literary 
adeptness, her courage on the battlefield and her self-presentation as a masculine subject, 
but for those who knew of her biological sex, culturally defined gender could never 
override nature. 
The notion of marriage for love, with its myriad political implications under the 
two sex model, was a consistent theme in Durova’s memoirs. Interestingly, the narrative 
in the Notes does not directly reflect the biographical facts of her childhood. She failed to 
include any description of her marriage at the age of sixteen, or the child that she gave 
birth to during those years. Durova’s narrative inaccurately states that she ran away from 
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home at age sixteen, the year that she was married, rather than at the age of twenty three, 
the year that she left her husband to join the army. According to Mary Zirin, Durova in 
her presentation as a man consistently lopped “seven years off her own age, her mother’s 
and even that of her faithful steed Alcides.”194 Durova thus went to great lengths to erase 
the part of her life where she took on the prescribed social position of a woman in the 
patriarchal conjugal family. 
Durova made repeated references to marriage for love in her memoirs. The 
passages about her early youth, “My Childhood Years,” positioned the consensual love 
between her parents in opposition to the compulsion to marry against one’s will that was 
typical of previous generations, identified with an archaic and tyrannical past. Durova’s 
mother fell in love with Captain Durov when she was fifteen, but “this was not the choice 
of her father, a proud, arbitrary Ukrainian pan [an honorific address].” As Durova writes, 
“[m]y grandfather ruled his family with an iron hand: any order of his was to be blindly 
obeyed, and there was no possibility of either placating him or changing any of his 
announced intentions.” In defiance of Durova’s grandfather, her mother ran away to 
marry her true love, Durova’s father.195 
Much later in the text, when Durova described her passage through Kazan after 
retreating East from Napoleon’s army, she related a story told to her by a local Tatar. She 
introduced a secondary narrator, Jakub, who sang a song about someone named 
Khamitulla. When Durova inquired, Jakub told her that Khamitulla was a young man 
who was his close friend. Khamitulla, Jakub told Durova, fell in love with a young 
woman named Zugra. “Zugra was a tall, swarthy, stately Tatar girl, with black eyes and 
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brows... the blackness of Zugra’s eyes and brows was somehow a captivating black! 
Something in them made Khamitulla’s heart ache cruelly.” Durova interjected a note of 
confusion into the narration of this story: “But, Jakub,” she said, “how did your 
Khamitulla manage to see his beloved? After all, your Tatar girls are hidden from men.” 
Jakub replied: “But not from those whom they seek to please; then they are very skillful 
in letting themselves be seen. It was enough that Khamitulla could tell the charming 
blackness of his Zugra’s eyes and brows from twenty other pairs of eyes and brows 
which were just as black.” 
In Durova’s account, Khamitulla became determined to have Zugra, even though 
her father refused to consider their marriage. The two defied the authorities in their tribe 
and ran away together to live in the woods. Because they lacked the approval of the tribe, 
a formal, legal marriage was impossible. After Zugra’s father rallied a band of armed 
men to find his daughter and kill her abductor, Khamitulla decided that they must part in 
order to preserve their lives. At the end of the story, Zugra offered an emotional 
monologue: 
Let us submit to our fate for a time, my sweet friend. Let us 
part until you find a place where we can once again be 
together. I will go to my father, but not to my husband, not 
for anything! He is no husband to me! They did not ask my 
consent. Let my father return the kalym [dowry]. I am 
yours, yours forever. I have had no other husband.196 
 
The focus on “consent” in this passage figures love as a symbol of freedom and as an 
escape from paternal authority. The principle of consent in love, introduced to Russia by 
Peter I, transcended paternal authority and customary law in this anecdote. Durova’s 
story showed that Zugra’s father could not determine who her true husband would be; 
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only her heart could. The use of Tatar society as the setting for this tale adds another 
dimension to Khamitulla’s and Zugra’s rejection of paternal authority; the tyrannical, 
hierarchical paternalism of “Eastern” tradition is contrasted against the transparent, 
honest emotions of the contemporary generations of European Russia, who had made a 
clear break from the practices of their ancestors. European Russia was here represented as 
more civilized than the Tatars at the empire’s periphery, especially if this tale is 
contrasted with the story of Durova’s parents. Whereas the principle of consensual love 
drove Durova’s parents to run away together, they were not hunted down and killed. In 
Durova’s view, these Enlightenment notions of love had yet to spread from the center of 
the empire to its periphery, even though the Tatars, whom she orientalized, desired the 
same freedom. 
 But Durova herself was not so infatuated with this notion of love. Indeed, toward 
the end of her memoirs she often mocked it. After the victory over Napoleon, Durova’s 
regiment was sent back to Russia from Holstein. A group of women followed along, “all 
of them fully expecting to marry the men they follow.” One member of her squadron, a 
“Pel.,” was mocked for his insistence that “his Phillida is following him under the spell of 
an inconquerable love for him.  We listen and can hardly restrain our laughter. An 
inconquerable love for Pel., a balding scarecrow, comical and stupid. Perhaps it is some 
kind of enchantment—nothing could be more handsome than his froggy eyes!”197 But it 
would be a mistake to read this passage as a dismissal of the importance of the ideal of 
love. Durova’s mocking attitude perhaps stemmed from a feeling of discomfort at the 
absurdity of the ubiquitous discourse of sincere love. She saw that these women had a 
material interest in marrying well-connected Russian soldiers, and her criticism was 
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aimed at the men who, in their masculine honesty, readily believed that they were 
sincerely loved.  
 In the same chapter, she mocked another comrade, a K., for his love of a young 
woman named P. “Comical news! K. is in love!...On the way he told me that... P.... is 
never out of his mind; and, finally, that he sleeps all the time from love and sorrow.” 
Durova had little sympathy for his predicament, writing, “I found all this extremely 
comical, but since I was alone, I somehow was able to keep from laughing...” K. then 
brought Durova with him to meet P. at her family’s estate. Durova sensed a contradiction 
between K.’s apparent conviction that his love was sincere and the way that he actually 
related to P. “[I]t is evident that K.’s love is no joking matter,” she wrote, in reference to 
how quickly he summoned the sergeant-major upon his arrival in the squadron to harness 
horses in order to visit P. As they traveled toward the estate, Durova was relieved, albeit 
perplexed that K., rather than obsessively talking about P., discussed “everything good 
and bad except the subject which I thought must be engaging his mind and heart.” Upon 
meeting her, Durova was amused by P.’s unattractiveness, describing her appearance as 
having “the bold mien of a grenadier... which pleased me greatly. If I were K., I too 
would choose her for my life’s partner and love her just the way he does: I would come to 
see her without hurrying to arrive, sleep the entire way, and wake up at the front door.”198 
 Durova sought to “escape the sphere prescribed by nature and custom to the 
female sex,”199 and she succeeded in doing so. Nevertheless, the ways in which she 
transgressed gender norms in the Russian Empire reveal her attachment to certain notions 
of gender, family, and love that were thoroughly embedded in the discourse of two sexes. 
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Her gender presentation did not reflect a negotiation of masculine and feminine 
characteristics, although this is the discourse of sex deployed by figures like Catherine II, 
who would have seemed an obvious model for escape from the bounds of feminine 
domesticity. Her critique of love, too, reveals that she viewed consensual love as a 
backdrop against which she put forward her critique of dishonesty. The story of her 
parents and the tragic story of Khamitulla and Zugra serve as a contrast to what she saw 
as the deceitful and self-interested deployment of the language of love. 
 Her erasure of her marriage in the memoirs further illuminates her attitude toward 
gender. Rather than justifying her having left home without her husband’s permission, 
she completely effaced her married life. In her memoirs, she appeared as though she had 
never married at all, and she addressed only her father’s disappointment at her having left 
home, despite the fact that she no longer lived with him when she ran away to enlist. 
Unlike Labzina, for whom a wife’s duty to her husband was intertwined with the notion 
of conjugal love, Durova seems to have had no such attachment to the notion of 
obedience. Although she did not fulfill the prescribed domestic role of a woman, her 
views reveal a construction of gender that was shaped by the discourse of the two sex 
model, even if elements of the one sex model remained. This last point, however, is not 
unique to Russia, as Laqueur points out. The idea of the two sexes never entirely 
displaced that of one sex, rather, it competed with it for primacy in the field of gender 
determination. Durova’s attitude reflected the triumph of the two sex model, even though 
she succeeded in escaping her biologically determined destiny. 
 The works of Labzina and Durova have serious implications for Schönle’s 
argument regarding the “scare of the self.” Schönle sees Russian authors in the late 
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as tending to promote the corporate identity of 
the nobility at the expense of individual privacy. He asserts, therefore, that no real sense 
of privateness ever emerged among the literary elite. He buttresses this assertion by 
observing that private property rights in the Russian Empire were not established at this 
time. Labzina, however, certainly understood her home as private, and her social role as a 
domestic one within the patriarchal conjugal family and within the home. Durova, too, 
had a feminine private self beneath her masculine presentation; hence, her reluctance to 
publish her Notes under her real name. Neither her identification with the corporate group 
of the nobility, nor the actions of the state, suppressed Durova’s sense of privacy. Both 
Durova and Labzina saw themselves as individuals in relation to a certain set of social 
conventions, to be sure, but these conventions were, in turn, shaped by individuals who 
cultivated their privateness. Labzina’s and Durova’s senses of self depended on and was 
constituted by a morality of love as the basis of marriage, and by conventions 
surrounding gender roles in the family. Clearly, The ideology of subjective 
equivalency—that is, the equivalency of masculinized subjects defined against a 
femininity that was seen as incommensurably different—deeply penetrated the 
consciousness of the educated elites of the Russian Empire, and acted as a foundation of 
cultural production from the Catherinian period onward. 
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Conclusion 
It is clear that in the mid- to late-eighteenth century in the Russian Empire the 
patriarchal conjugal family began to emerge as a strong cultural force and as a social unit 
that was understood as an integral part of the body politic. This process in many ways 
paralleled the roughly contemporaneous shifts in the western European understanding of 
gender, as documented by Thomas Laqueur and Joan Landes. The economic structure 
and political system of the Russian Empire differed from those of western Europe, but 
noting the economic and political differences alone is insufficient for understanding the 
extent to which parallel cultural processes were unfolding in Russia as in France, 
Germany, and England. In the case of Russia, as we have seen, the patriarchal conjugal 
family not only came to be identified as an important cultural institution, but was also 
deeply entangled with discourses of monarchical legitimacy and imperial expansion, and 
remained so in the nineteenth century. 
The process of this entanglement spanned decades. The reforms instituted by 
Peter I at the beginning of the eighteenth century set into motion a series of cultural 
shifts, such that the basis of the autocrat’s legitimacy was from that point onward 
dependent on the sovereign’s ability to pursue a program of progressive reform. 
Catherine II drew heavily on this reformist discourse of legitimacy, which was, perhaps, a 
necessity for her, as she was not connected to the Romanov line by heredity. When the 
motif of the imperial family erupted as an important image of power and legitimacy 
beginning with Paul, the discourse of reformist legitimacy was retained, not rejected 
outright. But the one sex model of gender deployed by Catherine was eroded by the 
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dominance of cultural ideals embodied by the patriarchal conjugal family, which in turn 
became a legitimizing scenario for displaying monarchical power. 
The autocrat retained—and made use of—the prerogative to condemn dissidence, 
and to condemn those of the empire’s subjects who expressed political views that 
challenged the autocracy. This was evident in the cases of Novikov and Radishchev. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which the two sex model became widely accepted among the 
elite of the Russian Empire was not subject to the monarch’s control. Ultimately, the 
discourse of the patriarchal conjugal family would function to erode the representation of 
legitimacy on which Catherine II depended. Ideas about the status of women and their 
role in public life brought forth lively discussions that were not directed by the autocrat. 
The use of the rational-critical faculties in the public sphere of the Russian Empire was 
highly restricted with regard to political matters—although the extent of this restriction 
has sometimes been exaggerated—but members of the public would freely debate the 
meaning of civic virtue, of moral and civic cultivation, and the role of domesticity. These 
issues, in turn, became integral to the discourses of legitimacy that the monarchy was 
compelled to use in order to justify its power. 
By investigating the question of the public sphere in the Russian context, this 
essay argued that although the economic development of the Russian Empire diverged 
from that of western Europe, the ideological consensus that emerged out of the public 
sphere in western Europe also framed the formation of publicity in Russia. The 
ideological components of bourgeois publicity that the Russian educated elites embraced 
to articulate their own social ideals—for example, the role of women in the public, the 
role of the family in moral cultivation, and the role of privacy in the development of 
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public exchange—show that the economic circumstances particular to western Europe 
were not a necessary condition for the formation of public life. 
As the patriarchal conjugal family increasingly came to represent a specifically 
Russian national character, the family itself became a symbol of the cultural inheritance 
of Russia that was protected from the onslaught of self-interest, passion, and fashion, and 
such symptoms of unrestrained market forces were contrasted against the power of the 
autocrat to carry out reforms in pursuit of the general good. The structural differences 
between the Russian Empire and western Europe, while obvious, did not prevent the 
emergence of a Russian public sphere that resembled the European one in its most central 
aspect—the fostering of rational-critical debate. Privateness, the family, the two sex 
model—all of these culturally defined notions emerged more or less in parallel in eastern 
as in western Europe. The development of public life in the Russian Empire was very 
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